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The market for multi-channel video programming has undergone considerable change in the
last 10 years. Direct-Broadcast Satellite service, spurred by 1999 legislation that levelled the
playing ¯eld with cable television systems, has grown from 3% to 25% of the U.S. MVPD (ca-
ble and satellite) market and now accounts for virtually all net new subscribers. This chapter
considers the merits of regulation in cable television markets in light of this development. It
surveys the (dismal) empirical record on the e®ects of price regulation in cable and the more
encouraging (but incomplete) evidence on the bene¯ts of satellite competition. It concludes with
a consideration of three open issues in cable markets: horizontal concentration and vertical inte-
gration in the programming (input) market, bundling by both cable systems and programmers,
and regional concentration ("clustering") by cable systems. While potential market failures in
distribution have clearly lessened, concerns regarding bundling and the programming market
remain.
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Now is a quiet time in the on-again, o®-again regulation of the cable television industry. Since
the 1996 Telecommunications Act eliminated price caps for the majority of cable service bundles
on March 31, 1999, cable systems have been free to charge whatever they like for the services
chosen by the vast majority of subscribers. That was a watershed year, as the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 also relaxed regulatory restrictions limiting the ability of direct-
broadcast satellite (DBS) systems to provide local television signals into major television markets.
Since then, satellite providers have added 13 million more subscribers than cable, giving them over
25% of the multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) marketplace and providing two
credible competitors to incumbent cable systems in most markets (FCC (2001d), FCC (2005b)).
On the other hand, the last 10 years has also seen continued consolidation in distribution, with
the top 8 ¯rms increasing their share of MVPD subscribers from 68.6% in 1997 to 80.1% in 2004
(FCC (1998b), FCC (2005b)). This has raised concerns about concentration and integration in the
programming market. Horizontal concentration and channel occupancy limits enacted after the
1992 Cable Act were struck down in 2001 and remain to be reinstated (FCC (2005d)). As cable
prices continue to rise, lawmakers wonder about the feasibility of µ a-la-carte services to reduce cable
prices (FCC (2004a), FCC (2006)).
This chapter considers the merits of regulation in cable television markets in light of these devel-
opments. I do so in three parts. In the ¯rst part, I survey past and present cable regulations
and assess their e®ects. The majority of this portion surveys the reasons for and e®ects of the
four major periods of regulation and deregulation of cable prices (1972-1984, 1984-1992, 1992-1996,
1996-present). The evidence for regulation is discouraging: unregulated periods exhibit rapid in-
creases in quality and penetration (and prices), while regulated periods exhibit slight decreases in
prices and possibly lower quality. Consumer welfare estimates, while few, suggest consumers prefer
unregulated cable services. This highlights the di±culty regulating prices in an industry (like cable)
where service quality cannot be regulated and is easily changed.
I then review the empirical record on the consequences of competition in cable markets with a
focus on satellites. Evidence from duopoly ("overbuilt") cable markets is robust: an additional
wireline competitor lowers cable prices, with estimates ranging from 8% to 34%. Evidence of the
e®ect of satellite competition is less compelling: surveyed rates are often only marginally lower and
sometimes higher. In an important recent study, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) suggest the importance
of controlling for the (unobserved) quality of cable and satellite o®erings and ¯nd when doing so
that DBS competition reduces cable prices by an estimated 15%. Despite satellite competition,
however, signi¯cant market power remains. The prospect of further entry into video markets by
incumbent local telephone carriers looks promising.
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gration and its consequences in the programming market, bundling in both the distribution and
programming markets, and regional concentration ("clustering") by cable systems. Conclusions in
these area are harder to come by. While horizontal concentration has clearly increased in the pro-
gramming market, theoretical models have ambiguous predictions of its e®ects and empirical work
is hampered by insu±cient data on a±liate fees (prices). The evidence on vertical integration is
more substantial: integrated systems clearly favor a±liated programming, but whether for reasons
of e±ciency or foreclosure remain unclear. Finally, bundling impacts market outcomes in both
the distribution and programming markets. In distribution, it clearly enables systems to better
capture surplus and o®er high-quality and diverse programming, but it may do so at signi¯cant
cost to consumers. How should one trade these o®? Worse, theoretical models suggest bundling
may enhance market power and serve as an e®ective barrier to entry, particularly in combination
with vertical integration and exclusive content, although there is no empirical evidence to support
these claims. The record on clustering is incomplete, but is an important area of concern especially
if it could inhibit telephone company entry into video markets. Empirical estimates of all these
e®ects are critically needed.
Note that the focus of this chapter is almost exclusively on the cable television market in the
United States. I do this for several reasons. First, the evolution of the MVPD industry and the
regulations that have applied to it di®er considerably across countries. This has led to dramatic
di®erences in the market reach of cable systems, their market share among households passed,
and the relative importance of cable versus satellite in the retail and programming markets (cf.
OECD (2001, Table 2)). Second, this is a mostly empirical survey, and by virtue of a series of FCC
reports both on cable industry prices and on competition in the market for video programming (e.g.
FCC (2005a), FCC (2005b)) and a private data collection industry (led by Kagan World Media
and Warren Publishing), there is surprisingly good information about cable systems in the United
States, both in the aggregate and for individual systems. Adequately analyzing the experience in
other countries would require a chapter in itself, a worthwhile undertaking but beyond the scope of
this e®ort. Finally, beyond a brief description of the current regulatory treatment, I do not consider
the economic and regulatory features of the market for broadband Internet access. In part, the
economic issues are di®erent and more suitable to a chapter on telecommunications, but in the main
for the same reasons as above. This is a deep and substantive policy issue whose treatment would
quickly exhaust my space. See Hausman's chapter on Telecommunications markets for further
analysis of this issue.
On the whole, the future looks bright for the organization of the cable television industry. Satellite
competition has largely replaced price regulation as the constraining force on cable pricing and
driving force for innovative services. Moreover, telephone company entry provides the prospect of an
additional signi¯cant competitor in the distribution market. Several important areas of uncertainty
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unknown and worthy of further study. So too in the programming market. While there is no clear
evidence of harm, more research is needed, particularly on the impact of horizontal concentration
on market outcomes in program supply and the risks of vertical integration, exclusive contracts,
and bundling. Until then, regulatory safeguards may still be necessary.
2 A Cable Television Lexicon
The essential features of cable television systems have changed little in the industry's 50 years of
existence. Then as now, cable systems choose a portfolio of television networks, bundle them into
services, and o®er these services to consumers in local, geographically separate, cable markets.
Cable systems purchase the rights to distribute program networks in the Programming Market.
Since the mid-1990s, cable systems in the U.S. have had to compete for customers with Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers. Together, cable and satellite systems are said to compete in
the Multi-channel Video Programming Distribution (MVPD) market. This is sometimes just called
the Distribution Market.
As in many media markets, the multi-channel video programming industry earns most of its revenue
from one of two sources: monthly fees charged by cable systems to consumers for access to pro-
gramming and advertising fees charged (mostly) by networks to advertisers for access to audiences.
Figure 1 demonstrates that advertising revenue has grown in importance and now comprises over
34% of the industry's $57.6 billion in 2004 revenue (NCTA (2005a)). Figure 2 provides a graphical
representation of the multi-channel video programming industry.
Insert Figure 1 Here
Insert Figure 2 Here
Cable systems today o®er four main types of program networks. Broadcast networks are television
signals broadcast over the air in the local cable market by television stations and then collected
and retransmitted by cable systems. Examples include the major, national broadcast networks
{ ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX { as well as public and independent television stations. Cable
programming networks are fee- and advertising-supported general and special-interest networks
distributed nationally to systems via satellite. Examples include some of the most recognizable
networks associated with cable, including MTV, CNN, and ESPN.1 Premium programming networks
are advertising-free entertainment networks, typically o®ering full-length feature ¯lms. Examples
include equally familiar networks like HBO and Showtime. Pay-Per-View Networks are specialty
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recent theatrical releases and specialty sporting events.
Systems exhibit moderate di®erences in how they bundle networks into services. Broadcast and
cable programming networks are typically bundled and o®ered as Basic Service while premium
programming networks are typically unbundled and sold as Premium Services.2 In the last 15
years, systems have further divided Basic service, o®ering some portion of their cable networks
in multiple bundles called Expanded Basic Services. In the last 5-7 years, systems have taken
advantage of digital compression technology to o®er as many as 8-10 digitally-delivered networks
on the space previously required to o®er a single analog network. These networks are typically also
bundled and o®ered as "Digital Tiers". For Basic, Expanded Basic, or Digital Services, consumers
are not permitted to buy access to the individual networks o®ered in bundles; they must instead
purchase the entire bundle.
In the last 10 years, cable systems have also begun to o®er high-speed (broadband) access to the
Internet. This required signi¯cant investments in physical infrastructure, notably to accommodate
digital data and allow upstream communication (cf. Figure 3). This has proven to be a successful
undertaking: despite being deployed several years after telephone systems' Digital Subscriber Line
(DSL) technology, cable systems now command over 63% of the broadband market, earning revenues
of $6.7 billion in 2003, over 12% of cable systems' total revenue and growing fast (FCC (2005b)).
Insert Figure 3 Here
As this chapter goes to press, cable systems continue to innovate in delivering video programming
to households. Spurred by the rise in popularity of the Tivo Digital Video Recorder (DVR),3 many
cable and satellite systems now o®er to lease or sell DVRs with up to 100 hours of recording time
to households. In addition, many cable systems now o®er video on demand and some plan to o®er
Internet-based video over their cable systems (Grant and Searcey (2005), Grant (2006b)).
3 A Brief History of Cable Regulation
3.1 The Early History, 1950-1984
The cable television industry began in the 1950s to transmit broadcast television signals to areas
that couldn't receive them due to interference from natural features of the local terrain.4 In order
to provide cable service, cable systems needed to reach "franchise agreements" with the appropriate
regulatory body (usually local municipalities). These agreements typically included agreements on
a timetable for infrastructure deployment, a franchise fee (typically a small percentage of gross
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prices for each class of o®ered cable service in return for an exclusive franchise to use municipal
rights-of-way to install the system's infrastructure.
Cable grew quickly until 1966, when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) asserted
its authority over cable operators and forbid the importation of broadcast signals into the top
100 television markets unless it was satis¯ed that such carriage "would be consistent with the
public interest, and particularly with the establishment and healthy maintenance of UHF television
broadcast service."5 It also instituted content restrictions that prevented the distribution of movies
less than 10 years old or sporting events broadcast within the previous 5 years. In 1972, the
FCC provided a comprehensive set of cable rules. First, it sought to balance broadcasting and
cable television interests by permitting limited importation of distant broadcast signals. It also,
however, imposed a host of other requirements, including Must-Carry, franchise standards, network
program nonduplication, and cross-ownership rules (FCC (2000b)).6
The next decade saw a gradual reversal of the 1972 regulations and a period of signi¯cant program-
ming and subscriber growth. First, rules originally established in 1969 were a±rmed in 1975 that
franchise price regulation must be con¯ned to services that included broadcast television stations
(GAO (1989)). As a result, premium or pay-TV stations were not nor ever have been subject to
price regulation. Second, in 1972 Time introduced Home Box O±ce (HBO) for the purpose of
providing original content on an advertising-free, fee-supported cable network. In 1975, it demon-
strated the ability to distribute programming via satellite and, in 1977, fought and won in court
against the FCC's content restrictions, allowing HBO and a generation of subsequent cable net-
works to provide whatever programming they desired.7 Since the production of programming is a
public good, the advent of low-cost satellite technology with sizeable economies of scale revolution-
ized the distribution of programming for cable systems. WTBS, CNN, and ESPN began national
distribution of general-interest, news, and sports programming, respectively, in 1979 and 1980. In
all, no less than 13 of the 15 most widely available advertising-supported programming networks,
and all of the top 5 most widely available fee-supported programming networks, were launched
between 1977 and 1984. Cable systems grew at double-digit rates.
3.2 Price Regulation Since 1984
While the scope of federal regulations had diminished by 1979, state and local regulations remained.
By the mid-1980s, however, the price terms of these contracts came under attack as cable joined
the "deregulation revolution" sweeping through Congress (Kahn (1991)). Convinced that three or
more over-the-air broadcast television signals provided a su±cient competitive alternative to cable
television service, Congress passed the 1984 Cable Act to free the vast majority of cable systems
6from all price regulations.8
By 1991, cable systems had dramatically expanded their o®ered services. The average system
o®ered a Basic Service including a bundle of 35 channels as well as 4-6 Premium Services (GAO
(1991)). Prices also increased, however, rising 56% in nominal and 24% in real terms between
November 1986 and April 1991.
Concerned that high and rising prices re°ected market power by monopoly cable systems, Congress
reversed course and passed the 1992 Cable Act to "provide increased consumer protection in cable
television markets". Regulation di®ered by tiers of cable service and only applied if a system
was not subject to "e®ective competition."9 Basic tiers were regulated (if desired) by the local
franchise authority, which was required to certify with the FCC. Cable programming (Expanded
Basic) tiers were regulated by the FCC.10 Both followed rules set by the FCC, reducing prices to
"benchmarks" based on prices charged by systems facing e®ective competition. In April 1993 the
FCC capped per-channel cable prices systems could charge for most types of cable service. The
FCC soon found, however, that not only did cable bills fail to decline, but that for nearly one-third
of cable subscribers, they had increased. Many systems had introduced new, unregulated services
and moved popular programming networks to those services; others had re-allocated their portfolio
of programming across services (FCC (1994), Hazlett and Spitzer (1997), Crawford (2000)). In
February 1994 the FCC imposed an additional 7% price reduction.
Responding to political pressure from cable systems, the FCC almost immediately began relaxing
price controls. First, "Going Forward" rules were established in November, 1994. As discussed by
Paul Joskow in his chapter analyzing incentive regulation in electricity transmission markets, an
important feature of incentive (price-cap) regulation are the rules governing the maximum price
over time. This is particularly important in cable markets, where both the number and cost of
programming networks regularly increase over time. Instead of allowing systems to increase prices
by a planned "cost + 7.5%" for each added network, the Going Forward rules permitted increases of
up to $1.50 per month over 2 years if up to six channels were added, regardless of cost (Hazlett and
Spitzer (1997)). Prices controls were further relaxed by the adoption of "Social Contracts" with
major cable providers in late 1995 and early 1996. These allowed systems to increase their rates for
Expanded Basic tiers on an annual basis in return for a promise to upgrade their infrastructure.11
The deregulatory process culminated with the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. This
eliminated all price regulation for Expanded Basic tiers after March 31, 1999. Regulation of Basic
Service rates remains the only source of price regulation in the cable television industry.
73.3 Must-Carry/Retransmission Consent
In addition to imposing price caps, the 1992 Cable Act introduced another set of regulations
whose e®ects are still being felt: Must-Carry and Retransmission Consent. Since 1972, cable
systems were subject to Must-Carry: they were required to carry all local broadcast signals available
in their franchise area. Systems fought Must-Carry, however, arguing it interfered with their
choice of content, and succeeded in having it struck down on First Amendment grounds in 1988.
The 1992 Cable Act, however, not only restored it but gave local broadcast stations the option
either to demand carriage on local cable systems (Must-Carry) or negotiate with those systems
for compensation for carriage (Retransmission Consent). These rules were upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1997.
Retransmission Consent has remained a point of contention between broadcast networks and cable
systems ever since. Agreements are often negotiated on repeating three-year intervals.12 Smaller
(esp. UHF) stations commonly select Must-Carry, but larger stations and station groups, partic-
ularly those a±liated with the major broadcast networks, have aggressively used Retransmission
Consent to obtain compensation from cable systems. Systems initially refused to pay stations di-
rectly for carriage rights, a position they have largely maintained to the present day.13 Instead,
they signed carriage agreements for broadcaster-a±liated cable networks. ESPN2 (ABC), Amer-
ica's Talking (NBC), and FX (Fox) all got their start this way.14 More recently, Disney (ABC) has
used Retransmission Consent to obtain expanded carriage agreements for SoapNet and the Disney
Channel and NBC to charge higher a±liate fees for CNBC and MSNBC (Schiesel (2001)). Indeed,
the power of retransmission consent to obtain carriage agreements was one stated motivation for
the purchase of CBS by Viacom in 1999. I revisit this issue when discussing bundling and market
power in Section 7.2.
3.4 Programming Market Regulations
While the focus of cable regulations has historically been on controlling prices charged by local
monopoly cable providers, there has been recent interest in the organization and operation of the
programming (input) market. The basic features of this market are as follows.15 Most network
production costs are ¯xed. Rights sales generate both transfer payments ("a±liate fees") from
MVPDs, typically in the form of a payment per subscriber per month, and advertising revenue.
The relative importance of each varies by network, but across basic networks 40% of revenue comes
from advertising (NCTA (2005a)). Programming is non-rivalrous: sales of programming to one
MVPD does not reduce the supply available to others.
Carriage agreements are negotiated on a bilateral basis between a network (or network groups)
8and an individual system or system groups, also known as Multiple System Operators (MSOs).
Comcast is the largest MSO in the United States with 21.2 million subscribers, or 23.4% of the
MVPD market. Many of the largest MVPD operators either own or have ownership interests in
programming networks as do major broadcast networks. Indeed, all of the top 20 (non-CSPAN)
cable networks by subscriber reach and all of the top 15 by ratings are owned by one of 8 ¯rms,16
raising concerns about diversity in the media marketplace.
The 1992 Cable Act introduced two important regulations regarding competition in the program-
ming market. First, it directed the FCC to establish reasonable limits on the number of subscribers
a cable operator may serve (the horizontal, or subscriber, limit) as well as the number of channels
a cable operator may devote to a±liated program networks (the vertical, or channel occupancy,
limit) (FCC (2005d)). These were set in 1993 at 30% of cable subscribers for the horizontal limit
and 40% of channel capacity (up to capacities of 75) for the vertical limit.17 In the Time Warner
II decision in 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded these
rules, ¯nding the FCC had not provided a su±cient rationale for their implementation. This re-
mains an unsettled issue, although the commission has recently begun a rulemaking proceeding on
it (FCC (2005d)). The 1992 Cable Act also introduced program access and carriage rules. These
forbid a±liated MVPDs and networks from discriminating against una±liated rivals in either the
programming or distribution markets and forbid exclusive agreements between cable operators (or
common carriers, i.e. telephone companies) and networks a±liated with cable operators (or com-
mon carriers). These rules are enforced through a complaint process at the FCC, but complaints
have been relatively rare, particularly in the recent 5 years. Notably these rules apply only to
satellite-delivered programming. This exception has become an issue in some regional markets (e.g.
Philadelphia and San Diego) as some regional networks distributed via microwave have reached
exclusive agreements with their a±liated MSO, excluding rival MVPDs from access to "critical"
content (FCC (2005d)).18
3.5 Merger Review
Under the 1934 Communications Act, the FCC's mandate is to ensure that the organization of
communications and media markets serves the "public interest, convenience, and necessity". This
mandate has been interpreted by the FCC to give it the power to approve or deny mergers among
communications or media ¯rms whenever it involves a transfer of licenses. Since the licenses involved
are necessary to o®er the ¯rms' services,19 in practice this gives the commission the power to approve
all media or communications merger.20 Prior to the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
this power wasn't exercised as existing regulations on ownership (e.g. ownership limits, cross-
ownership restrictions) foreclosed large communications and media mergers. Since then, however,
the commission has taken an ever stronger role in approving communications and media mergers,
9often imposing conditions on the merged entity.
Merger conditions, while not explicit regulations, have the same e®ect on ¯rms. Recent examples
of conditions placed on merging parties cover a variety of alleged harms. In the AT&T-Media One
merger completed in June of 2000, the commission ordered AT&T to divest su±cient assets to
come under the 30% horizontal subscribership limit. When these rules were remanded in 2001,
the FCC dropped the condition (Bloomberg News (2001)). In the AOL-Time Warner merger
completed in January of 2001, the commission imposed conditions on the merged entity to ensure
non-discriminatory access to the merged companies' network by third-party providers of Internet
access services as well as conditions in the instant messaging market (FCC (2001c)). This was in
addition to conditions on non-discriminatory access agreed to by the merged ¯rm in a consent decree
with the FTC. In the Comcast-AT&T merger completed in November of 2002, the commission
again ordered divestiture, this time of the merged ¯rms interests in Time Warner Cable.21 The
commission simply blocked the Echostar-DirecTV merger, voting unanimously to oppose it in
October 2002 (Wall Street Journal (2002)).22 Finally, in the News Corp-DirecTV and Adelphia-
Time Warner-Comcast mergers completed in December of 2003 and July of 2006, respectively, the
commission imposed a number of conditions, backed by a binding arbitration process, designed to
ensure non-discriminatory access to the combined ¯rms regional sports and broadcast programming
networks (Kirkpatrick (2003)).
3.6 Other Cable Regulations
Cable systems are subject to a myriad of additional regulations (FCC (2000b)). A few of these are
brie°y discussed here.
Broadband Access Regulation The market for high-speed (broadband) Internet access has
grown considerably in the last 5 years and is now an important source of revenue for most ma-
jor cable systems. It has also caused a regulatory ¯ght between cable systems, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), and local telephone providers ("telco's") over the appropriate regulatory treat-
ment of broadband access. As low-speed ("dial-up") access only required access to a local telephone
line, ISPs like AOL and Earthlink grew in the late 1990s without regulatory oversight. As broad-
band access became viable, however, telephone companies were required to share access to their
broadband (Digital Subscriber Line, or DSL) network with una±liated rivals.
In FCC (2000c), the FCC ruled that cable broadband service was an "information service" and
not a "telecommunications service" subject to common carrier (i.e. access) regulation. In June of
2005, the Supreme Court upheld this decision (Schatz, Drucker, and Searcy (2005)). In August
of 2005, a similar set of rules was put in place for DSL providers (Schatz (2005)). Going forward,
10DSL and cable will compete on near-equal terms and neither will be required to share access with
una±liated rivals.
Cable/Telco Cross-Ownership and Telephone Company Entry The 1984 Cable Act forbid
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) from providing cable service within their telephone service areas.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act relaxed this restriction, providing a number of methods under
which telephone companies could provide video service, including building a wireline cable system
(FCC (2000b, p.17)).23 Early e®orts at video entry were small in scale and often unpro¯table. The
largest e®ort was put forth by Ameritech (now owned by AT&T), which purchased and built cable
systems that passed almost two million homes. They were only able to attract 225,000 subscribers,
however, and exited the business in 1998 (FCC (2004b)). I discuss recent plans by LECs (notably
AT&T and Verizon) to enter the video business in Section 6.3.
3.7 Satellite Regulations
Federal regulation of the satellite television industry has also in°uenced the cable television indus-
try. While satellite distribution of programming was initially intended for retransmission by cable
systems, a small consumer market also developed. By the mid-1980s, approximately 3 million
households had purchased C-Band (12-foot) satellite dishes, mostly in rural areas without access
to cable service.
It wasn't until the mid-1990s, however, that direct satellite service to households thrived. Fuelled by
the complementary developments of improved compression technology, more powerful satellites, and
smaller (18-inch) satellite dishes, Hughes introduced DirecTV in 1993. Subscriptions grew quickly,
particularly among the estimated 20 million households without access to cable service. Wider
adoption was hindered, however, by a regulatory hurdle: in an e®ort to protect local television
stations, satellite systems were only permitted to provide broadcast network programming if the
household could not receive the local broadcast signal over-the-air. This hurdle was removed,
however, with the passage on November 28, 1999 of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act
(SHVIA). This permitted direct-broadcast satellite providers to distribute local broadcast signals
within local television markets. Within a year, satellite providers were doing so in the top 50-60
television markets. Satellite systems now provide a set of services comparable to those o®ered by
cable systems for the vast majority of U.S. households.24
Unlike cable systems, satellite providers have never been subject to price regulations. Most other
rules described above for cable service apply equally to satellite providers, however. For example,
since January 1, 2002, satellite providers that distribute local signals must follow a "carry-one,
carry-all" approach similar to Must-Carry and must negotiate carriage agreements with local tele-
11vision stations under Retransmission Consent (FCC (2005b)). Furthermore, under the conditions
put in place in the News Corp-DirecTV merger, the combined ¯rm is subject to the same rules
governing competition in the programming market.25
4 The Consequences of Cable Regulation and Deregulation
The cable industry has undergone several recent periods of regulation and `deregulation. This has
provided an ample record to evaluate the consequences of cable regulations. In this section I present
broad trends in economic outcomes in the industry. In the next section I evaluate the theoretical
and empirical evidence of the consequence of regulation on those outcomes.
4.1 The Facts to be Explained
Prices Figure 4 reports price indices from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from December, 1983
until June, 2006. Reported are series for (i) MVPD (i.e. cable + satellite) services and (ii) consumer
non-durables.26
Insert Figure 4 Here
Three distinct periods are clear in the ¯gure and are described in table 1 below. Reported in the
table is the compound annual growth rate for each price index corresponding to periods of cable
regulation and deregulation. The ¯rst period describes price increases following the passage of the
1984 Cable Act. Price deregulation from the 1984 Act begins in December 1986 and continues
until April 1993, when the ¯rst price caps from the 1992 Cable Act were implemented. The second
period begins at that point and continues until the passage of the "Going Forward" rules relaxing
price caps in November 1994. The third period starts at that point and continues to the present.
Insert Table 1 Here
From these price series, it certainly appears that regulation limited cable price increases and dereg-
ulation encouraged them. Prices in the period preceding the 1992 Cable Act increased at an annual
growth rate of 4.61% greater than that for other consumer non-durables. Similarly, prices after the
relaxation of the '92 regulation have increased at a rate 2.34% greater than that of non-durables,
while prices during the (short) regulatory period fell 3.45% relative to non-durables.
12Subscriptions Did lower prices lead to more subscriptions? Figure 5 reports aggregate sub-
scribers to cable and satellite services by year between 1983 and 2004. Unfortunately, this data
is only at the annual level, making precise predictions of the impacts of short regulatory periods
di±cult. Nonetheless, I duplicate the table on growth rates for prices both for cable subscribers
and all MVPD subscribers and report these in Table 2.
Insert Figure 5 Here
There are three interesting features of the data in Table 2. First, subscriber growth is positive
throughout the period, including periods when prices were rising. While many features of the eco-
nomic environment are also changing over this period, one plausible explanation for this relationship
is that the quality of cable services has been increasing over time. I measure it to the extent possible
in what follows. Second, despite lower prices between 1993 and 1995, cable subscriber growth is
lower than during the previous, deregulatory, period. This suggests regulation may itself have had
an impact on cable quality. Third, note the dramatic reduction in cable subscriber growth after
1995. While a normal feature of a market that is reaching saturation, this also re°ects the growth in
satellite as a viable competitor to cable: total MVPD (cable and satellite) subscriber growth, while
not at pre-1995 levels, is still substantial, despite reaching aggregate penetration rates exceeding
80% of U.S. households by 2004.27
Insert Table 2 Here
Quality Both the price and subscription data suggest that accounting for the quality of cable
service is important for understanding outcomes in cable markets. Measuring the quality of cable
services can, however, be very challenging. Various approaches have been taken in the economic
literature, from using simple network counts (Rubinovitz (1993), Crandall and Furchtgott-Roth
(1996), Emmons and Prager (1997)) to a mix of indicators for speci¯c networks (e.g. ESPN, CNN,
MTV) and network counts (Crawford (2000)) to imputing it from observed prices and market shares
under the assumption of optimal quality choice (Crawford and Shum (2007)).
Figures 6 and 7 provide two rough measures of cable service quality over time. The ¯rst, Figure 6,
reports the total number of programming networks available to systems as well as (from 1996) the
average number of Basic, Expanded Basic, and Digital Tier networks o®ered to households. Both
the number of networks available to systems and those actually o®ered to households has increased
considerably over time. This is particularly true in the periods 1978-1988 and 1994-present.28
Insert Figure 6 Here
13The number of cable networks is, however, an incomplete measure of cable service quality. The
value of programming on ESPN today is signi¯cantly greater than it was in 1985. This increase
in the value in programming can partially be measured by the cost to cable systems for that
programming. Figure 7 describes the average cost to cable systems of program networks (as well
as duplicating the average number of networks on Basic and Digital Tiers from Figure 6). The
top-most, solid, lines in the ¯gure use the left-hand axis and report the total per-subscriber cost
for networks charging a±liate fees according to Kagan World Media (Kagan World Media (1998),
Kagan World Media (2004)). The left half of this series is a list ("top-of-rate-card") price, while the
right half is an average (across systems) price. One can compare the pattern of these prices with
the average number networks over the same period, represented by the dashed line and using the
right-hand axis. The trend in total costs roughly matches the trend in number of networks. This
might be expected if network costs were constant over time. They are not, however. The bottom,
dotted, lines report the total per-subscriber cost for networks charging a±liate fees conditioning on
the networks charging positive fees in 1989. This isolates the increase in cost to cable systems from
increased quality for a given set of programming networks.29 Together, these series show that costs
to cable systems have been increasing over time due both to increased costs for existing networks
as well as increases in the number of o®ered networks.
Insert Figure 7 Here
Services A ¯nal feature of cable service that has evolved considerably over the last 20 years is
the number of services from which households can choose. Cable television technology is such that
all signals are transmitted to every household served by a system. As such, the least cost method
of providing any cable service is to bundle all the programming. Early cable systems did just
that. The development of Premium networks in the early 1980s, however, necessitated excluding
households that chose not to subscribe. This was costly, requiring a service technician go to each
household and physically block programming with an electromechanical "trap". The development
of scrambling (encryption) technology in the 1980s and 1990s solved that problem but instead
required households interested in such programming to have an "addressable converter" (set-top
box) to unscramble the video signal. Subscribers and subscriptions to Premium Networks grew (cf.
Figure 8).30
Insert Figure 8 Here
Addressable converters also allowed cable systems to unbundle some of their Basic networks. These
were called Expanded Basic Services (or Tiers). There was some concern in the late 1980s and early
1990s that cable systems were introducing tiers in order to evade rate regulation in the pre-1986 and
14post-1992 periods.31 These concerns have waned since the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act and most contemporary cable (and satellite) systems now o®er multiple Basic Services. Where
o®ered, the vast majority of households choose at least one Expanded Basic service.
Cable systems have continued to o®er more services in the 1990s and 2000s. Investments in in-
dustry infrastructure in the late 1990s and early 2000s and complementary developments in digital
compression technology have allowed systems to o®er "Digital Tiers" (or Services), bundles of
digitally-distributed networks, and broadband (cable modem) access to the Internet.32 Table 3
describes the recent evolution of these advanced service o®erings.
Insert Table 3 Here
The growing popularity of digital tiers (and associated digital converters) has led some consumer
advocates to call for cable systems to unbundle some or all networks and o®er them to consumers
on an µ a la carte basis (Consumers Union (2003)). I discuss this important policy issue in Section
7.2.
5 The Consequences of Cable Regulation
The challenge in interpreting these trends in the cable data are two. First, how much of the increase
in cable prices is due to increases in cable market power and how much is due to increases in the
quality of cable services? And to what extent has regulation limited the exercise of cable market
power or distorted the incentives to o®er quality? Second, even if systems charge monopoly prices,
if this gives rise to the right incentives to increase product quality over time, consumers may bene¯t
despite welfare losses from short-run market power. How have consumers valued changes in the
portfolio of cable services? How has regulation in°uenced these choices? I evaluate the theoretical
and empirical evidence on these questions in what follows.
5.1 Theoretical Models of Price and Quality Choice under Regulation
Most theory of optimal regulation focuses on products of a given quality or qualities (Breautigam
(1989), Armstrong and Sappington (2007)). While there are di±cult implementation issues in this
case, including how best to accommodate information asymmetries between the ¯rm and regulator
and how best to accommodate changes in the economic environment facing the regulated ¯rm over
time, the conclusions of the theory are straightforward: regulation can limit the exercise of market
power by limiting the prices ¯rms can charge.
15The problem is more challenging, however, when ¯rms can also choose product qualities. An
unregulated single-product monopolist may under- or over-provide quality depending on the nature
of consumer preferences and ¯rm costs (Spence (1975)). A single-product monopolist facing price-
cap regulation, however, will generally under-provide quality as it must bear the costs of any quality
improvements and may not be able to increase price to recoup those costs (Brennan (1989)). It is
the norm, therefore, to accompany price-cap regulation with mechanisms that monitor and penalize
¯rms for adverse product quality (Armstrong and Sappington (2007)).
Products o®ered by unregulated multi-product monopolists, by contrast, can often be subject to
quality degradation: o®ered qualities are below the e±cient level for all consumers except those
with the highest tastes for quality (Mussa and Rosen (1978)). Regulation, depending on its form,
generally reduces distortions, but can have ambiguous e®ects on prices and welfare (Besanko,
Donnenfeld and White (1987, 1988)). If applied to a subset of products, ¯rms may unbundle their
o®erings and introduce new products in order to evade the regulations (Corts (1995)).
In this section, I brie°y present a simple, two-type version of the Mussa-Rosen model of optimal
price and quality choice under regulation originally developed by Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White
(1987).33 This motivates the conclusions described above and provides a useful basis for evaluating
the likely consequences of price regulation in cable markets.
The Mussa-Rosen Model Consider a monopolist selling two goods, q1;q2 whose qualities can
be freely varied over Q = [0; ¹ Q].34 Consumers are assumed to be di®erentiated by a type parameter
measuring their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for quality which takes on three distinct values, t0;t1;t2
(t0 < t1 < t2), with respective probabilities, fi (with f0 + f1 + f2 = 1), and associated cumulative
distribution function, Fk ´
Pk
j=0 fi. Type 0, t0, is included to allow for the possibility that some
consumers prefer not to purchase either of the ¯rm's products. For convenience, I assume the
hazard function for the type distribution,
fi
1¡Fi, is increasing in i. As in cable markets, the ¯rm is
assumed to o®er a tari® specifying a di®erent total price per quality variant o®ered, P1;P2. The
¯rm knows the distribution of types in the population and selects the tari® that maximizes his
expected pro¯t (with the expectation taken over consumers types).
Consumer preferences are assumed to be quasilinear in money, ui ´ u(q;ti) = v(q;ti) ¡ P(q). A
consumer of type ti is assumed to choose that bundle, qi, which maximizes her utility and provides
her at least her reservation utility. These are the well-known incentive-compatibility (hereafter IC)
and individual rationality (IR) constraints.






fifP(qi) ¡ C(qi)g (1)
16subject to the IC and IR constraints. C(qi) is the ¯rm's cost function, which is assumed purely
additive across consumers.35 De¯ne the total surplus function S(q;ti) ´ v(q;ti) ¡ C(q). Under
standard assumptions, one can use the IC constraint to rewrite the objective function, yielding:
max
q1;q2;u1
E[¼] = f1fS(q1;t1) ¡ u1g + f2fS(q2;t2) ¡ [v(q1;t2) ¡ v(q1;t1)] ¡ u1g: (2)
This problem is solved by setting the utility of the lowest type to zero, u1 = 0, and maximizing








where vq ´ @v
@q. Quality degradation for the low type (i = 1) is visible from the ¯rst equation in
(3). The socially optimal quality for each type, denoted q¤¤
i , is that which sets the derivative of the
total surplus function to zero, Sq(q;ti) = 0. In the ¯rst line of (3), however, note that q1 is chosen
so that Sq(q;t1) > 0, implying q¤
1 < q¤¤
1 : quality is degraded to low types. By contrast, there is no
degradation \at the top", i.e. for the higher type t2. Given optimal qualities from equation (3),
optimal prices fall out naturally from the IR and IC constraints. Since u1 = 0, p1 = v(q1;t1) and
p2 = v(q2;t2) ¡ [v(q1;t2) ¡ v(q1;t1)].
Figure 9, adapted from Maskin and Riley (1984), demonstrates graphically the solution for the
one-dimensional case with N = 2. I focus only on the solid curves in that ¯gure. The ¯rm would
like to extract all consumer surplus by o®ering product qualities q¤¤
1 and q¤¤
2 and charging prices
p¤¤
1 and p¤¤
2 , but with such an o®ering the high type would prefer to mimic the low and select q¤¤
1
(note for a given quality, consumer utility is higher the lower on the ¯gure they can locate). The
constrained optimum is given by variables with single ¤'s. As above, the high type continues to




Insert Figure 9 Here
Price and Quality Choice Under Regulation In a pair of papers, Besanko, Donnenfeld,
and White (1987, 1988) extend the Mussa-Rosen model to consider a monopolist's quality choice
problem in the presence of regulation. They consider three forms of regulation { Minimum Quality
Standards (MQS), Maximum Price (Price-Cap) Regulation, and Rate of Return Regulation { the
second of which is most relevant in cable markets.
17Suppose regulation forbids setting a price for a good higher than a given level, ¹ p. This introduces
a set of constraints, pi · ¹ p, 8i, on the ¯rm's objective function in (2). For convenience, assume
that p¤
1 < ¹ p < p¤
2, i.e. the constraint binds (if at all) only for the highest quality good o®ered to
consumers.36
Let ¸ be the lagrange multiplier associated with the price cap, p2 · ¹ p. The ¯rm's ¯rst-order
conditions are then
Sq(q1;t1) =






¹ p = v(q2;t2) ¡ [v(q1;t2) ¡ v(q1;t1)]
(4)
The right-hand side of the third line of (4) is the formula for p2 in the unconstrained problem.
Taken together, the equations in (4) show that ¸ is set to ensure p2 is no higher than ¹ p. Assuming
the price cap is binding, prices for the high-quality good are clearly lower.
Setting a price cap also has an important e®ect on qualities. Comparing the second lines of (4) and
(3) demonstrates that in the presence of a price-cap, quality falls for the high-quality good. With
a price cap, the ¯rm cannot charge as much as it would like for a good of the e±cient quality.
Since it can't raise prices, it simply reduces quality until the price cap is the optimal price to
charge.37 Do consumers bene¯t? Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1988) show that they can for
small reductions in prices, but both consumer and total welfare can fall if caps are set too low.
Implications for Cable Television Markets Are these results likely to apply in cable television
markets? I argue they are, at least for Basic and Expanded Basic Services.38 Cable price regulations
before 1984 were governed by terms negotiated between cable systems and the local franchise
authority. While the theory may apply in those settings, it would depend on the speci¯c terms of
those agreements. Generalizing about the many and heterogeneous forms of local price regulation
in place at that time is therefore di±cult.
Price regulations implemented after the 1992 Act, however, map fairly well to the theory; only a
few features of the actual regulations di®ered from the assumptions described above. In particular,
while the theory assumes only the high-quality good is subject to price caps, prices for all Basic
and Expanded Basic (so-called Cable Programming) Services were subject to regulation under the
'92 Act. That being said, most systems in the mid-1990s either o®ered a single Basic Service or,
if o®ering multiple Expanded Basic Services, earned the majority of their Basic Revenue from the
highest-quality service(s), making the e®ect of the regulations on those services the practically
most relevant ones.39 Furthermore, while the theory describes price caps in levels, prices in cable
18markets were regulated on a per-channel basis. If anything, however, this made it easier for systems
to adjust their (per-channel) product quality by allowing them to add relatively low-value networks
rather than dropping networks as would have been necessary to come under a ¯xed cap.
Why then didn't regulators also regulate product quality, as in Telecommunications, Electricity,
and other regulated product markets? In cable markets they cannot. The primary components of
product quality for cable television services are the television networks included on those services.40
By the First Amendment, cable systems have the freedom of expression and regulators cannot
therefore mandate what networks to carry (or not).
What then can one conclude from the theory as applied to cable television markets? While the
speci¯cs of regulatory interventions matter, the theory strongly advises against the use of price caps
in markets, like cable, where quality cannot be regulated and is easily changed by ¯rms. While
prices may fall, so too will quality. Furthermore, market power may be una®ected: the regulated
price is likely to move toward the optimal monopoly price for the (now-lower) quality. Worse, unless
caps are set well across markets and time - and how can regulators know? - consumers and ¯rms
can both be worse o®.
5.2 Econometric Studies of the E®ects of Regulation
Does empirical research con¯rm these ¯ndings? How much of the increase in cable prices is due
to the exercise of cable market power and how much is due to increases in the quality of cable
services? And what e®ect has regulation had?
5.2.1 Research Using Time Series Data
A number of studies have broached these questions using time series data. Ja®e and Kanter (1990)
and Prager (1992) analyze the impact of the 1984 Cable Act on outcomes in ¯nancial markets to
infer it's e®ects on cable system market power.41 Ja®e and Kanter (1990) analyze the impact of
the 1984 Cable Act on the sales price of cable franchises exchanged between 1982 and 1987 and
¯nd important compositional e®ects: while sales prices appear unchanged in the top 100 television
markets (where competition between cable and broadcast markets was stronger), they ¯nd large and
signi¯cantly positive e®ects outside of these markets. This suggests that, with the relaxation of price
regulations, cable systems were expected to be able to exercise market power where competition
was weak and that this expectation translated into higher sales prices for franchises. Prager (1992)
analyzes the impact of news events associated with the 1984 Cable Act on stock prices for 10 publicly
traded cable television companies between 1981 and 1988. She ¯nds no evidence of an increase in
stock prices at the time the Act was passed, but does ¯nd that cable stocks outperformed the market
19ex post, i.e. in the years after the rate deregulation was actually implemented. Such unanticipated
changes are consistent either with widespread uncertainty about the likely e®ects of deregulation or
with an actual increase in market power due to increased quality of and demand for cable services
(possibly themselves in°uenced by deregulation).
Hazlett and Spitzer (1997) use aggregate time-series data to analyze the impacts of both the 1984
and 1992 Cable Acts. In addition to surveying the economic literature at that time, they analyze
a host of outcome measures, including prices, penetration (subscriptions), cash °ows, tiering, and
quality (as measured by the number of networks, their expenditure on programming, and their
viewing shares), and reach three main conclusions. First, price increases after the 1984 Cable Act
and price decreases after the 1992 Cable Act were associated with similar changes in cable service
quality. Second, (monthly) subscription data suggest that price deregulation did not decrease
subscriptions and price regulation did not increase them. Finally, systems appeared to evade price
regulation by introducing new Expanded Basic tiers and moving popular programming to those
tiers.42 Similar patterns are apparent in the aggregate data presented in the last section.
There are several di±culties drawing ¯rm conclusions about the impact of regulation using aggre-
gate time series data, however. First, it is often di±cult to control for all changes in the economic
environment other than the change in regulation (e.g. aggregate sectoral, demographic, and/or
macroeconomic trends). Furthermore, a lack of observations often limits the ability to draw strong
statistical inferences. The majority of studies analyzing questions of cable market power and the
impact of regulation have therefore used disaggregate cross-section data.
5.2.2 Research Using Disaggregate Cross-Section Data
Reduced Form Approaches Early empirical work using cross-section data tested the joint
hypothesis that cable systems had market power and that regulation reduced their ability to exercise
that power. Most authors used a reduced-form approach, regressing cable prices (or other outcome
variables) across markets on indicators of the presence and strength of regulatory control. The
evidence from these papers is generally mixed. For example, Zupan (1989a) analyzes data on a
cross-section of 66 cable systems in 1984 and ¯nds prices are $3.82 per month lower in regulated
markets. Prager (1990), however, analyzes a sample of 221 communities in 1984 ¯nds the opposite
result: rate regulation is associated with both more frequent and larger rate increases. Similarly,
Beutel (1990) analyzes the franchise award process in 27 cities between 1979 and 1981 and ¯nds that
franchises were generally awarded to systems that promised to charge higher prices per channel.43
One possible reason for this literature's lack of consistent results is the likely endogeneity of the
regulation decision within local cable markets. The decision to regulate prices for local cable
service (when permitted) likely depends on observed and unobserved features of the cable system,
20market, and household tastes for cable service and regulation. Ideally one would instrument for
the decision to regulate, but ¯nding factors that in°uence the presence or strength of regulation
but don't in°uence prices can be quite challenging.44
A Framework for Measuring Market Power More recent empirical research has taken a
di®erent approach to measuring cable market power and the impact of regulation. Following Bres-
nahan (1987), an empirical literature within the ¯eld of Industrial Organization has developed that
provides a set of empirical tools to measure market power using explicit models of ¯rm behavior and
observations on ¯rms' prices and quantities (or market shares).45 Furthermore, this framework can
also measure changes in quality and the impact of regulation on ¯rm behavior. I brie°y introduce
this framework and then survey existing research applying it in cable television markets.
Consider a cross-section of markets each occupied by a single ¯rm selling a single product of ¯xed
quality.46 Let aggregate demand in each market be given by Qn = D(pn;yn), where Qn is quantity
demanded in market n, pn is price of the good in market n, and yn are variables that shift demand
across markets (e.g. income, other household characteristics, etc.). As each ¯rm is a single-product
monopolist, optimal prices in market n are given by:




where cn is the marginal cost of the good in market n. This equation shows that prices in market
n equal marginal costs plus a markup. Rearranging terms yields the familiar Lerner Index, (pn ¡
cn)=pn = 1=²D
n where ²D
n is the (absolute value of the) price-elasticity of demand in market n.
The Lerner Index shows that price-cost margins (equivalently, markups) are higher the lower the
absolute value of the elasticity of demand facing the ¯rm.
If we could observe marginal costs, cn, and demand, D(pn;yn), we could simply calculate the
markup in each market. Firms facing more inelastic demand would have greater markups and thus
more market power. In practice, however, we don't observe either. To infer market power, we must
estimate them.
Assuming the data provides su±cient variation and good instruments for prices, estimating demand
is a straightforward proposition.47 Estimating marginal costs is more di±cult. Rather than obtain
hard-to-¯nd cost data, the typical solution is to make an assumption about how marginal costs
vary with observables (e.g. cost factors, quantity) and estimate them based on their in°uence on
observed prices in (5).48 If these issues can be overcome, it is possible to estimate the market power
facing ¯rms across markets and/or time.
Suppose now that the ¯rm in market n is regulated. The extent to which this constrains its pricing
21can be parameterized as follows.




Here µ measures the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs in market n. If demand and
marginal costs can be estimated, one can use (exogenous) variation in demand to estimate µ by
examining how much prices exceed marginal costs across markets with di®ering elasticities of de-
mand.49 If regulation is constraining ¯rm behavior, prices will be close to marginal costs even if
demand is inelastic (i.e. µ ¼ 0). If not, prices will be close to the monopoly markup (i.e. µ ¼ 1).
Quality change is also easy to accommodate, at least in principle. Let qn measure the quality of
the product in market n. If we now parameterize demand by Qn = D(pn;yn;qn), prices are given
by




If quality is higher in some market (or time period), demand will increase and/or become more
inelastic, increasing prices. Separating the in°uence of quality change and market power is simply
then a matter of assessing the relative strength of qn and µ on prices.50
Measuring Market Power and the E®ects of Regulation in Cable Markets Two papers
apply the framework above to measure the impact of regulation on pricing in cable markets.51 First,
Mayo and Otsuka (1991) estimate demand and pricing equations for Basic and Premium services
using data from a cross-section of over 1,200 cable markets in 1982. Regulation at this time
was determined by terms of local (municipal or state) franchise agreements and varied across the
markets in the study. Across all systems (regulated or not), µ is estimated at 0.097 (0.021). While
signi¯cantly di®erent from 0, the relatively small value suggests regulation signi¯cantly constrained
system pricing.52
Second, Rubinovitz (1993) estimates demand, pricing, and quality (number of channels) equations
for Basic cable services using data from a panel of over 250 cable systems in both a regulated
period (1984) and an unregulated period (1990). In the raw data, prices are 42% higher in the
latter period, but satellite channels have more than doubled and subscriptions are more than 50%
greater. For reasons of idiosyncratic model speci¯cation, the absolute level of µ cannot be identi¯ed
in each period, but di®erences in µ can. This he ¯nds to be 0.18 (0.08), implying that, controlling for
increased costs due to expanded channel o®erings, the increased exercise of market power increased
prices by 18%, or .18/.42 = 43% of the observed price change. He concludes both increased quality
and increased market power were responsible for deregulated price increases.
Almost all the studies surveyed to date focus on the impact of regulation on prices. But what of
quality? The aggregate data in Section 4.1 suggest understanding regulation's impact on quality is
22critical to understanding outcomes in cable markets. In a recent paper, Crawford and Shum (2007)
extend the market power framework to assess the impact of regulation on both prices and quality
in cable markets. Rather than use observed measures of service quality (e.g. number of o®ered
networks), they use data from a cross-section of 1,042 cable markets in 1995 to estimate preferences
and costs and then use the implication of the optimal price and quality choice to infer the level
of o®ered quality in each cable market. An example provides the intuition for their procedure.
Suppose the cable systems in two markets had identical market shares for each of two o®ered
services, but the price of the high-quality service was higher in the ¯rst market. The higher price
in the ¯rst market suggests households are willing to pay more for cable service quality in that
market (perhaps because mean household age or household size is larger in that market).53 By
making high types more pro¯table, this tightens the incentive compatibility constraint for those
types, increasing the incentive to degrade quality for low types. Thus even if prices are similar in
the two markets, o®ered quality (under the theory) must be lower in the ¯rst.
After inferring the quality of each o®ered service in each cable market, the authors relate these
quality measures to indicators of whether the cable market had certi¯ed with the FCC to regulate
Basic Service under the terms of the 1992 Cable Act. They ¯nd that quality for high-quality goods
is somewhat higher, that quality for low- and medium-quality goods is substantially higher, and that
quality per dollar for all goods is higher in regulated markets (despite higher prices). Interestingly,
these e®ects are consistent with the theoretical predictions of minimum quality standards (and not
price-cap regulation).54
Measuring the Consumer Bene¯ts of Regulation The previous studies focus on the impact
of regulation on cable prices and quality. This relies on a static view of cable markets and focuses
on the short-run losses from cable market power. A long-run view must acknowledge that monopoly
pro¯ts provide strong incentives for systems to invest in service quality if that enhances consumer
willingness-to-pay for cable services. Two studies estimate consumer demand for cable services and
ask about the welfare e®ects of (i.e. bene¯ts to consumers from) cable price regulation.55
Crandall and Furchtgott-Roth (1996, Chapter 3) examine the welfare e®ects of changes arising
from the 1984 Cable Act. They estimate a multinomial logit demand model on 441 households
from 1992 and augment that with information about the cable service available to 279 of them in
1983. Despite the substantial increase in prices in this period (cf. Figure 4), they estimate that
households would be have had to be compensated by $5.47 per month in 1992 to face the choices
available to them in 1983.56
Crawford (2000) examines the welfare e®ects of changes arising from the 1992 Cable Act. He
also estimates a multinomial logit demand system on 344 cable systems from 1992 and 1995.57
Furthermore, he introduces a new approach for measuring service quality. Rather than simply
23counting the number of networks o®ered by systems, he controls for the actual identities (among
the top-20 cable networks) of those networks (e.g. ESPN, CNN, and MTV). This turns out to be
important not only for accurate estimation of cable demand, but in valuing household welfare from
the Cable Act.58 He ¯nds a welfare gain of at most $0.03 per subscriber per month. The lack of
e®ect is not due to quality reductions in response to price caps, but the simple fact that (in his
data) prices increased despite the regulations.59
5.2.3 Conclusions
The accumulated evidence is not encouraging for proponents of regulation in cable markets. Re-
search based on time-series data suggest that while prices brie°y declined after the 1992 Cable Act,
so too may have product quality. Detailed econometric studies based on disaggregate cross-section
data provide mixed evidence. Some ¯nd that regulation lowers cable prices from monopoly levels,
while others ¯nd negligible e®ects. Evidence of the impact of regulation on quality is positive,
although further research is necessary, and evidence on consumer welfare e®ects of changes in cable
choice sets is, if anything, in favor of deregulation.
6 The Rise of Competition in Cable and Its E®ects
The rise of competition from satellite providers has dramatically changed the cable marketplace.
Whereas for 40 years the vast majority of households faced a local cable monopolist, most house-
holds have the option of three or more MVPD providers, with the prospect of more on the way.
This section addresses the impact on cable prices and services of competition in the distribution
market.
6.1 Duopoly ("Overbuilt") Cable Markets
There is considerable evidence that cable prices are lower when there are two wireline competitors
in a market. Hazlett (1986a) ¯nds that cable prices are $1.82 lower in duopoly relative to monopoly
cable markets. Levin and Meisel (1991) analyze a cross-section of 47 cable systems in 1990 and ¯nd
that, controlling for the number of programming networks o®ered, cable prices are between $2.94
and $3.33 per month less in competitive relative to non-competitive cable markets. Emmons and
Prager (1997), using data on a cross-section of 319 cable markets in 1983 and 1989, obtain similar
results: prices for incumbents that face competition from another cable system are an estimated
20.1% lower in 1983 and 20.5% lower in 1989.60
More recent data suggests a similar pattern. Using data from the ¯ve most recent FCC reports
24on cable industry prices, Table 4 reports the average price, number of channels, and price/channel
for cable systems de¯ned by the FCC as noncompetitive, facing a wireline competitor, and facing
satellite competition.61 The upper panel of the table presents the raw data, while the lower panel
presents the percentage di®erence between systems facing either a wireline competitor or satellite
competition and the noncompetitive sample.
Insert Table 4 Here
The ¯rst set of columns suggest that prices are lower for cable systems facing a wireline competitor
than for those that do not face competition. De¯nitive conclusions about causality are di±cult,
however, due to selection problems. Entry by a competitor is not exogenous to the price charged by
an incumbent cable system or the characteristics of the entertainment market. If new ¯rms entered
into markets where incumbent cable systems charged high prices, the table likely under-estimates
the true e®ect of wireline competition on prices. Similarly, as most wireline competition occurred
in large urban markets and these have more substitutes to cable, the table may over-estimate the
true e®ect. Accurately controlling for di®erences in economic conditions across markets and the
endogeneity of entry is required in order to make stronger conclusions from such data.
Table 4 also reports the correlation between wireline competition and cable service quality (as
measured by the number of Basic and Expanded Basic channels) as well as the price per channel,
a useful competitive benchmark. Keeping in mind the same concerns about selection, conclusions
about wireline competition and quality are mixed. The table suggests cable systems facing wireline
competition may or may not o®er greater numbers of Basic and Expanded Basic channels, but do
o®er a lower price per channel than do noncompetitive systems. Further analysis of recent price
and quality data that controlled for the endogeneity of wireline entry would be welcome.
6.2 Competition between Cable and Satellite
The problem with duopoly cable markets is they are rare, accounting for only 1-2% of all cable
markets (FCC (2005b, Footnote 627)). From a policy perspective, it is much more important
therefore to assess the impact of satellite competition on cable prices and quality.
Table 5 reports the trend in cable and satellite subscribers, their respective share of the MVPD
market, and their share of new MVPD subscribers since 1993. Satellite subscriptions grew very
quickly, even before 1999 when SHVIA allowed satellite providers to distribute local broadcast
channels. Since then, however, cable subscriptions have been °at as almost every (net) new MVPD
subscriber has gone to satellite.
Insert Table 5 Here
25Table 4 also provides some evidence on the e®ect of satellite competition on prices and service
quality. Turning to the third set of columns in each group, the table reports average prices, number
of channels, and price per channel for cable systems who have been granted a ¯nding of e®ective
competition due to facing at least two satellite competitors whose total market share exceeds 15%
of the MVPD market.62 The table suggests both a selection e®ect and a competitive e®ect. The
experience of the early years suggests that satellite succeeded earliest in those cable markets that
had high prices, few channels, and high prices per channel. After 1999, however, satellite began
to draw customers away from cable and this is likely to have had a competitive e®ect. Under this
view, systems that were most a®ected began adding channels, lowering prices, or both, so that by
the end of the sample, such systems o®ered more channels than their noncompetitive counterparts
at slightly (2-4%) lower prices.
While this is promising, it is not as large as one might expect. Given the keen interest in the role of
satellite competition, Congress also commissioned the General Accounting O±ce to conduct several
studies of satellite's impact on cable prices and product o®erings (GAO (2000), GAO (2003)). The
early study, using 1998 data, found a positive and signi¯cant impact of increased satellite market
share on a cable incumbent's prices, while the latter study, using 2001 data, found a negative and
signi¯cant (though economically small) impact.
So where is the bene¯t of satellite competition? A fundamental problem in such studies (as in
Table 4) is that a regression of cable prices on satellite market shares su®ers from a problem of
correlated unobservables. If tastes for video programming di®er across markets, both satellite
market shares and cable prices will be higher in markets with greater tastes for programming,
causing an upward bias on the e®ect of satellite shares on cable prices. Similarly, if o®ered cable
qualities are (unobservably) higher in markets with high satellite shares, as for example if cable
systems improve service quality in the face of satellite competition, a similar e®ect will arise. One
solution is to instrument for satellite market shares in the cable price equation, but that can be
di±cult if instruments are hard to ¯nd.63
In a widely cited study, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) suggest a solution to this problem. First,
they estimate a multinomial probit demand system for Expanded Basic, Premium, and satellite
services from a sample of roughly 30,000 households in 317 television markets in early 2001. Using
a system's franchise fee as their primary price instrument, they ¯nd own-price elasticities of -1.5
for Expanded Basic, -3.2 for Premium, and -2.4 for satellite along with quite plausible (and large)
cross-price elasticities.
As in previous studies, they regress cable prices on (a nonlinear transformation) of satellite market
shares.64 Unlike previous studies, however, they also include estimates of unobserved characteristics
and tastes for Expanded Basic and Premium cable services. By including composite measures of
cable service quality, this approach "takes the correlated unobservable out of the error" and allows
26a consistent estimate of the impact of satellite share on cable prices.65
They ¯nd the e®ect to be both statistically and economically signi¯cant. Reducing satellite pene-
tration to the minimum observed in the data is associated with a $4.15 (15%) increase in the price
of cable services. They also ¯nd it is associated with a slight increase in the observed quality of
cable services.
6.3 Telephone Carrier Entry into Video Markets
While encouraging, the evidence for the bene¯ts of satellite competition are less compelling than for
wireline competition. Is there the prospect of further wireline entry in video markets? The answer
is a quali¯ed yes. While entry from independent "over-builders" has long-since stalled, several local
telephone carriers (LECs) have ambitious plans to enter video markets.66
As described in section 3.6, the 1996 Telecommunications Act permitted LEC entry into video
markets. Each of the four extant LECs (AT&T, Bellsouth, Qwest, and Verizon) now o®er video
programming in some form, mostly by reselling satellite services bundled with telephone service
and broadband access (DSL). Verizon and AT&T, however, are also upgrading their networks in
order to provide television to the home in direct competition with cable and satellite companies.67
Verizon has a head start in this venture, began o®ering television service in September 2005, and
planned to have passed 3 million homes by the end of the year (Reardon (2005)); AT&T plans on
rolling out similar services to 19 million homes by mid-2008 (Grant (2006a)). A recent FCC report
found total subscribers to each service of 100,000 for AT&T and 500,000 for Verizon in 2007 (FCC
(2007, Par. 24)). While encouraging, this is still less than 1% of the total MVPD market.
An important likely determinant of the near-term bene¯ts of LEC entry is the ease with which they
can obtain agreements to provide video service with local franchise authorities (LFAs). LECs have
complained that the existing franchising process is an important barrier to entry in cable markets.
For example, Verizon estimates it must obtain agreements with almost 10,000 municipalities if
it wishes to provide video programming throughout its service area and that LFAs (backed by
incumbent cable operators) take too long and require too many concessions (FCC (2005c)).68 In
September 2005, Texas passed a law introducing a simpli¯ed statewide franchising process and the
FCC has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore its options to facilitate wireline entry
nationwide (FCC (2005c)).
6.4 Conclusions
Are (most) cable markets competitive? The evidence for wireline competition is encouraging,
but its narrow scope limits bene¯ts to a small fraction of cable households. While there is some
27evidence of a positive impact of satellite competition on cable prices, the estimated cable price
elasticities suggest cable systems still exert considerable market power.69 Is this a call then for
further price regulation in cable markets? The °exibility of cable quality choice and accumulated
interval evidence surveyed in the last section argue against regulatory solutions. Further wireline
competition in distribution looks to be the most promising potential solution.
7 Open Issues in MVPD Markets
In this section, I consider three open issues in cable and satellite markets: horizontal concentration
and vertical integration in programming, bundling, and regional clustering by families of a±liated
cable systems.
7.1 The Programming Market
Since the Time Warner II decision rescinded the FCC's horizontal subscriber and vertical channel
occupancy limits in 2001, the regulatory treatment of the programming market has been unsettled.
In this section, I discuss potential market failures in the programming market and survey the
economic literature analyzing these issues.
7.1.1 Horizontal Concentration and Market Power
The primary economic issue in the programming market is that of market power. Cable systems
have evolved from small locally-owned operations into major national corporations. Table 6, drawn
from FCC reports on the status of competition in the programming market, reports concentration
measures for the industry for several of the past 15 years.70
Insert Table 6 Here
As can be seen in the table, concentration has increased over time.71 While the sum of the market
shares for the top 4 MVPD providers (as well as the HHI) has held steady, the share accruing to
the top 8 and top 25 have increased.72 Now that the two major satellite providers are among the
top 4, it is likely to grow even more concentrated in the future.
There are both pro- and anti-competitive e®ects possible from increased concentration. Increased
¯rm size may yield economies of scale, greater facility developing and launching new program
networks, and lower costs for investing in and deploying new services like digital cable, broad-
28band Internet access, and telephone services. It may also, however, increase market power in the
programming market.
There has unfortunately been little agreement over the appropriate analytical framework for ana-
lyzing outcomes in the programming market. The FCC's original horizontal subscriber limits were
based on an "Open Field" analysis which determined the minimum viable scale for a programming
network and then set limits such that no two maximal-size MVPD providers could jointly exclude
the network from the market (FCC (2005d, Par 72)). The Time Warner II decision, however,
criticized this approach as lacking a connection between the horizontal limit and the ability to
exercise market power.
The FCC has advanced a monopsony model as a potential alternative framework (FCC (2005d, par.
85-89)). Under monopsony, a supplier with market power purchases homogenous inputs until his
marginal revenue equals his marginal factor cost. Unlike standard settings where marginal factor
costs are given by (presumably competitive) input markets, with monopsony power, a supplier may
set prices in the input market and does so to trade o® increased revenue from the marginal input
against increased costs of higher payments to all inframarginal inputs.
A monopsony approach does not appear useful in describing the programming market, however.
Networks are di®erentiated in important ways, implying there is no single "posted price" required
of the monopsony setting. Furthermore, if any cable operator with market power were to reduce its
purchases of programming at the margin, it would have no obvious e®ect on the prices it pays on
inframarginal programming. Instead, MSOs and program networks negotiate on a bilateral basis
over the potential gains from carrying that network. Barring substitutability or complementarity
between networks, failing to carry one network has little e®ect on prices paid to another.
A Bargaining Approach Given the institutional features of the programming market, a bar-
gaining framework seems most appropriate for analyzing outcomes. Unfortunately, bargaining
models are known for their wealth of predictions, often depending on subtle features of the rules
of the game that are hard to verify in practice. What can bargaining theory tell us about market
power and the consequences of horizontal concentration in programming markets?
The conventional wisdom is that increased concentration in the MVPD market improves the bar-
gaining power of cable systems, reducing a±liate fees to program suppliers. In the simplest models,
increased size for an individual cable system reduces the viability of a program network if an agree-
ment is not reached between the two parties. This necessarily lowers the networks "threat point,"
increasing the expected surplus to the cable system (with speci¯cs determined by the particular
model).
Some bargaining models, however, yield predictions contrary to the conventional wisdom. For
29example, Chipty and Snyder (1999) ¯nd that increased concentration can actually reduce a MVPDs
bargaining power. They ¯nd that the size of the surplus to be split between a cable system and a
programming network depends on the shape of network's gross surplus function. If this function
is convex, marginal systems provide more surplus than inframarginal systems (with the opposite
result for concave gross surplus functions). If the rule governing the split of surplus is invariant to
merger, an important assumption, a convex gross surplus function yields disincentives to merge as
the sum of the surplus being negotiated is larger for two separate versus one merged ¯rm. Using
data on advertising revenues from 27 networks for up to 9 years in the 1980s and early 1990s, they
estimate the shape of networks gross surplus function (net of a±liate fees). While intuition might
suggest it is convex early and concave late,73 they ¯nd the opposite. For networks of larger size, the
authors conclude that systems have disincentives to merge for bargaining power and that e±ciency
considerations must be driving system consolidation.
In another widely cited study, Raskovich (2003) builds a bargaining model with a pivotal buyer,
i.e. one with whom an agreement is necessary for a seller's viability. In his model, being pivotal is
disadvantageous as if an agreement is not reached the seller will not trade and it is only the pivotal
buyer who can guarantee this outcome. As such, gains to the pivotal buyer are equal to its private
gains less the shortfall required to ensure viability of the supplier. This can reduce the incentives
to merge if merging would make a buyer pivotal.
Empirical Results What does empirical work suggest about horizontal concentration and out-
comes in the programming market? Assessing the consequences of increased system size on network
surplus in programming markets is conceptually simple, but lack of data on transaction prices (af-
¯liate fees) has prevented much empirical work. Ford and Jackson (1997) exploit rarely available
programming cost data reported as part of the 1992 Cable Act regulations to assess (in part) the
impact of buyer size and vertical integration on programming costs. Using data from a cross-section
of 283 cable systems in 1993, they ¯nd important e®ects of MSO size and vertical a±liation on
costs: the average/smallest MSO is estimated to pay 11%/52% more than the largest MSO and
vertically a±liated systems are estimated to pay 12-13% less per subscriber per month. Chipty
(1995) takes a di®erent strategy: she infers the impact of system size on bargaining power from its
in°uence on retail prices. She also ¯nds support for the conventional wisdom that increased buyer
size reduces systems' programming costs.
7.1.2 Vertical Integration
Many MVPD operators either own or have ownership interests in programming networks. So do
major broadcast networks. This has also drawn considerable attention from regulators in MVPD
30markets. FCC (2005b) documents the status of vertical integration in current MVPD markets. In
brief, of 388 national programming networks and 96 regional programming networks in 2004, 89
(24), or 23% (25%), were a±liated with a major cable operator.74 An additional 103 (22), or 27%
(23%) were a±liated with a broadcast programming provider.75 Furthermore, all of the top 20
networks by subscribers (save C-SPAN) and top 15 by ratings are owned by either a cable operator
or broadcast network.
As in most cases of vertical integration, there are both e±ciency and strategic reasons MVPDs and
program networks may want to integrate. For example, vertical integration could eliminate double
marginalization, improving productive e±ciency. Similarly, it could minimize transactions costs and
reduce the risk of new program development. It may also internalize important externalities between
systems and networks in the areas of product choice, service quality, and brand development.
Alternatively, integration may permit cable systems to discriminate against (or raise the costs
of) rival MVPDs or allow program networks to discriminate against (or raise the costs of) rival
networks.
Existing empirical research has universally found that vertically integrated MVPDs are more likely
to carry their a±liated program networks, but whether this is pro- or anti-competitive remains
an open issue. Waterman and Weiss (1996) examine the impact of vertical relationships between
pay networks and cable operators in 1989. They ¯nd that a±liated MSOs are more likely to carry
their own and less likely to carry rival networks. Subscribership follows the same pattern, though
they ¯nd no estimated e®ect on prices.76 Chipty (2001) addresses similar questions, including
whether integration in°uences MVPD carriage of Basic cable networks. Using 1991 data, she
¯nds integration with premium networks is associated with fewer premium nets, fewer basic movie
networks (AMC), higher premium prices, and higher premium subscriptions. On balance she ¯nds
households in integrated markets have higher welfare than those in unintegrated markets, although
the e®ects are not statistically signi¯cant. As in the studies analyzing the impact of regulation,
however, it is di±cult to assess if di®erences across cable systems in product o®erings and prices are
driven exclusively by integration or by other features of integrated systems (e.g. size, marketing,
etc.).
7.1.3 Conclusions
The analysis of competition in the programming market is unfortunately inconclusive. Even if in-
creased concentration in distribution increases distributor bargaining power, conventional "monop-
sony" welfare losses would not occur. Indeed the interests of on the integrated distributors and
program networks would seem to be aligned to produce programming that increases their joint
surplus and covers the programmers ¯xed costs. Instead, it is the combination of concentration
31and integration that could (but need not) lead to market failure, unfortunately fear he provides no
sharp predictions in empirical work has been unable to address this point. If this is a market of
interest to policymakers, there is a clear mandate for improved data collection { particularly of the
a±liate fees systems pay to networks { and analysis prior to any formal rule-making.
7.2 Bundling
MVPD providers choose a portfolio of television networks and bundle them into services for sale
to consumers. As complaints about high and rising cable bills continue, recent regulatory and
legislative focus has turned to the consequences of bundling in cable and satellite markets. By leg-
islative request, both the General Accounting O±ce and the Federal Communications Commission
analyzed the likely e®ects of bundling in cable markets, ¯nding mixed but generally negative (and
extremely uncertain) e®ects for consumers (GAO (2003), FCC (2004a)). In 2006, the FCC, under
a new chairman, published a follow-up study that repudiated many of its earlier conclusions and
found that unbundling could actually improve consumer welfare (FCC (2006)).
Is then bundling a market failure in cable markets? Might not µ a la carte sales improve consumer
welfare? I survey the existing theoretical and empirical evidence in what follows.
7.2.1 Theoretical Motivations to Bundle
In most product markets, bundling enhances economic e±ciency. A variety of industries emphasize
the bene¯ts of bundling in simplifying consumer choice (as in telecommunications and ¯nancial
services) or reducing costs from consolidated production of complementary products (as in health
care and manufacturing). In either case, bundling promotes e±ciency by reducing consumer search
costs, reducing product or marketing costs, or both. Moreover, if pro¯table, bundling can enhance
incentives to o®er products by increasing the share of total surplus appropriable by ¯rms (Crawford
and Cullen (2007)).
Bundling can also, however, reduce consumer welfare in product markets. An in°uential theoretical
literature suggests bundling may arise in many contexts to sort consumers in a manner similar to
2nd-degree price discrimination (Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976)). When consumers have
heterogeneous tastes for several products, a monopolist may bundle to reduce that heterogeneity,
earning greater pro¯t than would be possible with component (unbundled) prices. Bundling - like
price discrimination - allows ¯rms to design product lines to extract maximum consumers surplus.
While ¯rms clearly bene¯t in this case, consumer welfare may fall, often because bundling requires
consumers to purchase products in which they have little interest (Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999),
Armstrong (1996)).
32Moreover, bundling can also be used to extend market power or deter entry (e.g. Whinston (1990),
Nalebu® (2004), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000)).77 In this context, bundling reduces the market for
potential entrants by implicitly providing a discount on "competitive" products for all consumers
with high tastes for "noncompetitive" products. I describe each of these theories and brie°y consider
their implications for the cable industry in what follows.
Bundling to Price Discriminate Most of the discriminatory bundling literature has focused
on the incentives to bundle two goods. Adams and Yellen (1976) formalize the seminal work of
Stigler (1963) and present examples where bundling is more or less pro¯table than component
(unbundled) sales. 78 A simple example, adapted from Adams and Yellen (1976) demonstrates the
discriminatory incentives to bundle.
Insert Figure 10 Here
There are two goods and four consumers, whose willingness-to-pay (WTP) for each good is rep-
resented by a point in the top panel of Figure 10. The bottom three panels show the demand
for each good (if o®ered separately) and demand for the bundle of both goods implied by these
reservation values. Unbundled sales yield pro¯ts of $140 while bundled sales yield pro¯ts of $200.
In this example, bundling permits the monopolist to extract all available consumers surplus.
The reduction in preference heterogeneity in the example (and associated surplus extraction) gen-
eralizes and is the primary bene¯t of bundling. It is not su±cient, however. In a more general
setting, when bundled sales are preferred to component sales depends on three critical features of
preferences and costs. First is the extent of heterogeneity reduction possible from bundling. This
increases with the negative correlation in preferences for bundle components, a point made clear
by the example.79 Second is the level of marginal costs for components. Since bundling requires
consumers purchase all goods, some below-cost sales of components can result (e.g. consumers A
and D in the example), reducing the gains from bundling. This becomes more likely the higher are
marginal costs relative to the mass of consumer preferences. Third is that bundling requires ¯rms
charge a single price. When consumer tastes for components di®er considerably (e.g. multiply
WTP for one of the example goods by 100), bundling is less attractive than component sales as it
permits fewer instruments (prices) to capture consumers' surplus.80
Bundling to Enhance Market Power and Deter Entry Two recent papers by Nalebu®
(2004) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) demonstrate the additional advantage of bundling as a
means to extend market power or deter entry. To understand this argument, consider an example
provided by Nalebu® (2004).
33Suppose a monopolist providing two goods (A & B) is facing a potential entrant in either component
(but not both). Suppose consumers value only one unit of each good, that their willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for the goods is uniformly distributed on the unit square, and that there is no
complementarity or substitutability in demand (so their WTP for a bundle is just the sum of the
component WTP). Marginal and ¯xed/entry costs are zero. To ¯x ideas, suppose the monopolist
must pre-commit both to a method of sale (bundling or components) as well as a price/prices.81
If the monopolist sells each good separately, the entrant will enter one market (e.g. market B),
just undercut the monopolist's price, and earn all the sales in that market. What happens if he
bundles? The intuition is captured by the following ¯gure.
Insert Figure 11 Here
In this ¯gure, the monopolist bundles goods A & B. Again the entrant will enter, but this time
with smaller e®ect. All consumers that value good B at greater than its price will buy it. This is
given by the shaded area in the southeast of the ¯gure. All remaining consumers that value the
two goods at greater than the bundle price will buy it. This is given by the shaded area at the top
of the ¯gure.
Note the e®ect bundling has on the potential market for the entrant. Because all consumers with
high willingness-to-pay for good A will tend to prefer the bundle, the entrant is able to only compete
for half the market, i.e. those with low WTP for good A. In e®ect, bundling A with B allows the
monopolist to provide an implicit discount on good B to all consumers with high WTP for good
A. The entrant cannot match that discount and is e®ectively foreclosed from that portion of the
market.
If the entrant faces ¯xed entry costs, bundling in this setting can foreclose the market from potential
entry. Even if the entrant does enter, his pro¯ts will be lower than if the monopolist did not bundle.
7.2.2 Bundling in Cable Markets
There are many possible motives for bundling. Which are likely to applying cable markets? And
what are the implications for consumer and total welfare?
It is easy to motivate that bundling reduces costs to cable systems. As described in Section 4,
and it is unbundling networks that is costly, requiring methods to prevent consumption by non-
subscribers. While the rise of addressable converters (set-top boxes) is lowering this cost, many
cable subscribers do not currently use them.82 Furthermore, bundling simpli¯es consumer choice,
reducing administrative and marketing costs, and it guarantees widespread availability, a feature
viewed as essential for networks seeking advertising revenue (FCC (2004a)).
34It is also widely believed, however, that systems bundle to price discriminate in cable markets.
Cable systems and program networks both argue that bundling allows them to capture surplus
from the (possibly many) low-value consumers that would likely not choose to purchase a channel
on a stand-alone basis (FCC (2004a)). Furthermore, using data from a cross-section of 1,159
cable markets in 1995, Crawford (2007) tests the implications of and ¯nds quali¯ed support for
the discriminatory theory. He estimates the pro¯t and welfare implications of his results, ¯nding
that bundling an average top-15 special-interest cable networks is estimated to increase pro¯ts and
reduce consumer welfare, with an average e®ect of 4.7% (4.0%). On balance, total welfare increases,
with an average e®ect of 2.0%.
If it both reduces costs and enhances surplus extraction, it is no surprise that ¯rms like to bundle
in cable markets. But what about consumers? Might not consumers bene¯t from unbundled, i.e.
µ a la carte, sales? Crawford and Cullen (2007) analyze this question using numerical techniques,
paying particular attention to bundling's implications for the number and type of networks o®ered
by systems. They make assumptions about the nature of household willingness-to-pay and ¯rm
costs in cable markets, calibrate these to an "average" 2004 (Expanded Basic) service bundle,
and explore the pro¯t and welfare implications of o®ering an additional network on a bundled
versus µ a la carte basis. They ¯nd that, consistent with the conventional wisdom, bundling provides
stronger incentives to o®er networks than would µ a la carte sales, but may do so at signi¯cant cost to
consumers. The incremental ¯xed and marginal costs to cable systems from o®ering µ a la carte sales
and its impact in the advertising market are important factors in determining consumer bene¯ts.
Claims of bundling's potential to deter entry or enhance market power have been made in both
the distribution and programming markets. In the distribution market, wireline competitors to
incumbent cable systems have articulated versions of the market power argument when objecting
to (i) the terrestrial exception to the program access and carriage rules and (ii) the "clustering" of
cable systems within localized (e.g. MSA) markets (FCC (2005b, Paragraphs 154-158)). In each
case, rival MVPDs may be at a signi¯cant competitive disadvantage, even if the foreclosed network
is the only network by which rival bundles di®er. In the programming market, MVPD buyers have
complained about the bundling of a±liated program networks, both when negotiating rights to
broadcast networks under retransmission consent as well as critical non-broadcast networks (FCC
(2005b, Paragraphs 162), FCC (2005d, Footnote 232)). In this case, program networks that compete
with those bundled with high-value networks may have di±culty obtaining carriage agreements,
particularly if they appeal to similar niche tastes. Responding to these concerns, the FCC in late
2007 announced a new proceeding to ivestigate the issue (Cauley (2007)). Unfortunately, there
is little empirical evidence of entry deterrence in either the distribution or programming markets.
Empirical studies of these topics would be welcome.
357.2.3 Conclusions
Is bundling a market failure in the cable industry? While no ¯rm conclusions can be drawn, several
areas are of concern and are worthy of further study. Regarding the discriminatory e®ects of
bundling, while it is likely that bundling does better than µ a-la-carte sales of providing incentives
for program carriage and quality improvement (and surely lowers per-channel prices), it may do so
at considerable cost to consumers. Estimates of its likely impact on system costs and the advertising
market are critically needed to form policy in this area.83
Similar uncertainties surround bundling for market power. While existing theoretical research does
not draw explicit welfare conclusions, it is clear that bundling can have important competitive
e®ects, particularly if, as seems to be the norm in programming markets, it is partnered with
vertical integration and horizontal concentration. This could represent a substantial barrier to
entry for diverse independent programming in cable markets.
7.3 Regional "Clustering" of Cable Systems
A recurring complaint among entrants in local cable markets is the increasing consolidation of
systems within a single urban area. This "clustering" of cable systems is not the subject of any
particular FCC proceeding, but rather has arisen in the proceedings surveying competition in
the multichannel video programming marketplace (FCC (2005b, Par. 141-142, 157, 168)), setting
horizontal and vertical ownership limits (FCC (2005d, Par 65)), and conducting merger reviews
(Adelphia Communications Corporation, Comcast Corporation, and Time Warner Inc. (2005, pp.
49-60).
Table 7 presents patterns of clustering in the cable industry since 1994.84 While the total number
of clusters has risen only slightly over time, these clusters have encompassed an ever-greater share
of cable subscribers. From a low of 33.7% of cable subscribers in 1994, clustered systems quickly
grew to serve 82.1% of cable subscribers by 2001. While not represented in the table, it has since
increased again as a consequence of the Comcast/Time Warner-Adelphia merger approved in July
2006 (America's Channel LLC (2005, pp. 30-31))).
Insert Table 7 Here
There are both pro- and anti-competitive motivations for clustering. Incumbent cable systems
emphasize the technical, economic, and promotional advantages of clustering. They argue clustering
allows them to optimize their system architecture, achieving local economies of scale by eliminating
wasteful infrastructure duplication, e±ciently introduce new services, especially broadband access
and telephone services, and market those services once they are in place. They also argue that the
36growing importance of advertising revenue (cf. Figure 1) encourages clustering by enabling them
to o®er extensive market coverage to local and regional advertisers. On the other hand, clustering
may increase barriers to entry for wireline competitors, particularly if the incumbent cable operator
can use its local market dominance to obtain access to exclusive programming of local or regional
interest (FCC (2005b, Par. 157)).
Despite the importance of this issue to local competition in cable markets, there is relatively
little empirical analysis of the topic. The FCC brie°y analyzed clustering in its 2000 Report on
Cable Industry Prices (FCC (2001a, pp. 15-16)). In that survey, they asked systems whether
they belonged to a cluster and whether they o®ered broadband access and telephone services, two
maintained motivations to cluster. 69% of systems reported to be in a cluster and, of these, 48%
o®ered Internet access and 7% o®ered telephony. Among systems not in clusters, the comparable
percentages were 43% and 6%. They also looked at the impact of clustering on prices, ¯nding
across a variety of speci¯cations that prices were 2% higher in markets where the system was part
of a cluster.85 Singer (2003) analyzes the impact of clusters on the probability of entry by wireline
competitors ("overbuilders"). He ¯nds a large, signi¯cant, negative e®ect of cluster size (measured
as the sum of the population in contiguous areas owned by the same system) on entry probabilities.
While more work is clearly needed, the empirical record suggests that clustering may have adverse
e®ects on prices and entry in local cable markets.
8 Conclusion
This chapter surveys the consequences of economic regulation in the cable television industry and
evaluates the impact of competition from satellite television providers on potential market failures
in the industry. Prospects for e±cient outcomes in the distribution market look better than ever.
Satellite competition has largely replaced price regulation as the constraining force on cable pricing
and driving force for innovative services, a welcome outcome given the empirical record on the
regulation's e®ects in cable markets. Moreover, telephone company entry provides the prospect of
an additional signi¯cant competitor in many cable markets. Bundling in the distribution market
likely provides important bene¯ts to ¯rms, but may do so at signi¯cant cost to consumers. More
research is needed to quantify these costs and assess outcomes in a world without bundling.
In the programming market, the jury is still out. While there is no clear evidence of harm, more
research is needed, particularly on the impact of horizontal concentration on market outcomes in
program supply and the risks of the combination of horizontal concentration, vertical integration,
and bundling.
37Notes
1So-called cable networks earned their name by having originally been available only on cable.
2Premium networks have recently begun "multiplexing" their programming, i.e. o®ering multiple channels under
a single network/brand (e.g. HBO, HBO 2, HBO Family, etc.).
3A Digital Video Recorder is a device that allows households to record video to a hard drive-based digital storage
medium.
4See Foster (1982, Chapter 5) and Noll, Peck, and McGowan (1973) for a survey of the history of broadcast
television and its regulation.
52 FCC 2d at 782 as cited in Besen and Crandall (1981, p.90).
6Must-Carry rules require systems to carry all local broadcast signals available in their franchise area. These
rules were amended by the 1992 Cable Act.
7See HBO v. FCC, 567 Fd 2nd 9 (1977).
8Other terms of franchise agreements remained in e®ect. See GAO (1989).
9There are four separate tests for e®ective competition: (i) a cable market share under 30%, (ii) there are at least
two una±liated MVPDs serving 50% of the cable market and achieving a combined share of 15%, (iii) the franchising
authority is itself a MVPD serving 50% of the cable market, and (iv) the local exchange carrier o®ers comparable
video programming services (47 CFR 76.905).
10In what follows I use Expanded Basic tier to refer to the FCC designation Cable Programming tier.
11See, e.g., FCC (1998c, p.6) describing the FCC's social contract with Time Warner. In it, Time Warner was
permitted to increase its Expanded Basic prices by $1/year for 5 years in return for agreeing to invest $4 billion to
upgrade its system. It also dismissed over 900 rate complaints and provided small refunds to subscribers.
12Must-Carry requirements must be negotiated on repeating three-year intervals. Retransmission Consent agree-
38ments sometimes follow the same cycle, but often are for longer periods.
13Satellite operators, by contrast, have sometimes paid directly for carriage rights.
14America's Talking became MSNBC in 1996. CBS lacked any a±liated networks in the initial Retransmission
Consent negotiations but used them to launch Eye on People in 1996.
15See Wildman and Owen (1985) for a detailed description of the market for the supply of programming.
16Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, and Cablevision among cable MSOs; News Corp/Fox, Disney/ABC, Viacom/CBS,
and GE/NBC among broadcasters.
17The 30% limit was changed in 1999 to 30% of MVPD subscribers.
18The program access rules forbidding exclusive contracts were extended by the FCC for another ¯ve years in
September, 2007.
19In the case of cable systems, the licenses to be transferred are the cable television relay service license that "are
essential to the operation of the [¯rm]" (FCC (2001b)).
20Note that the FCC's merger review process is in addition to that required by competition law: any merger
between ¯rms of a given size (roughly sales or assets of $50 million) must be approved by the federal antitrust
authorities, the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, under the Clayton Act.
21This condition had been agreed to in advance by the companies (Feder (2002)).
22They were not alone. The Department of Justice also sued to stop the merger.
23Many early cable franchise agreements were exclusive within a given municipality. The 1992 Cable Act forbid
exclusivity.
24At this chapter goes to press, EchoStar (Dish Network) provides broadcast programming in about 160 television
markets and DirecTV about 145.
25At this time, EchoStar does not own signi¯cant programming interests and is not subject to programming rules.
3926The cable series began including satellite services in the late 1990s. In principle, it has also included satellite
radio since 2003, although as of October 2005 no satellite radio data had been sampled.
27Table 5 shows that since the passage of the SHVIA in 1999, cable subscriber growth has e®ectively been zero.
28These are likely supply-side phenomena, the former driven by the relaxation of FCC content restrictions and the
feasibility of low-cost satellite distribution and the latter driven by signi¯cant upgrades in cable infrastructure and
the (possibly anticipated) rollout of digital tiers of service.
29Consistent with conventional wisdom, this suggests new networks charge lower average prices than established
networks. Indeed, new networks often pay systems (i.e. charge negative prices) for a period of years before becoming
established and negotiating positive fees.
30Subscribers to Premium Networks are often called "Pay Households". Total subscriptions to Premium Networks
are often called "Pay Units".
31This concern was driven by di®erential regulatory treatment of di®erent tiers in the various regulatory periods.
The 1992 Act in particular introduced a split regulatory structure, with local franchise authorities given authority
to regulate rates of Basic service and the FCC given authority to regulate rates of Expanded Basic services. Some
estimates of total subscribers to Expanded Basic Services fell after the 1984 Cable Act and increased again after the
1992 Act (GAO (1989), GAO (1991), Hazlett and Spitzer (1997)).
32By converting a video picture from an analog to a digital signal and compressing the digital signal, between 4-12
digital networks can be carried on the space of a single analog network. This requires a more advanced addressable
converter to both unscramble and decompress the digital signals purchased by the household.
33The material in this subsection is presented in more detail in Crawford and Shum (2007).
34Since this is a model of monopoly, it best applies to understanding the period when satellite service either was
not available or was unable to o®er local broadcast networks, i.e. before 2000. This is arguably benign, as similar
results are available in oligopoly settings (Stole (2007)).
35I make the usual curvature assumptions: v1 > 0; v11 < 0; v2 > 0; c
0 > 0;c
00 > 0, as well as the normalization
40that v(0;ti) = 0, for all i. Furthermore, I maintain the standard single-crossing condition that uqt > 0, which implies
higher types have greater willingness-to-pay for quality at any price, or that consumers may be ordered by their type,
t.
36The implications for quality of the high-quality product would follow if, as for cable markets in the mid-1990s,
there were product-speci¯c caps that bound for each product. I discuss how well the theory maps to speci¯c regulations
in cable markets below.
37The e®ect on low types is the opposite. The ¯rm cannot extract as much surplus from high types with a price
cap. This relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint for high types, reducing the incentive to degrade quality to
low types. As such, quality and prices actually rise for low-quality goods.
38Recall that prices for Premium Services may not and have never been regulated (cf. Section 3.1).
39For example, see the sample statistics for 1995 data in Crawford and Shum (2007). Furthermore, Basic Services
are the most important o®ered by cable systems, providing ¯ve times the revenue of (unregulated) Premium Services
(NCTA (2005f))
40Other dimensions that matter, albeit less, include customer service, signal reliability, and advanced service
o®erings.
41Such "event study" techniques were ¯rst applied to analyze the impact of regulation by Schwert (1981), Binder
(1985), and Rose (1985).
42This is not surprising given the nature of the cable regulation over time. Local and state price regulations (prior
to 1984) and federal price regulations (after 1994) often applied only to the lowest bundle of networks o®ered by the
system. This introduced incentives to o®er Expanded Basic tiers to avoid price controls. Corts (1995) and Crawford
(2000) provide further theoretical and empirical support for this view.
43Some authors have attributed such ¯ndings to evidence of rent-seeking by local franchise authorities (Hazlett
(1986b), Zupan (1989b)).
44See Crawford and Shum (2007) for a representative discussion of this issue.
4145See the citations in Bresnahan (1989) for an extensive bibliography. Berry and Pakes (1993) and Nevo (2000)
are more recent applications.
46Much of the presentation in this section follows Bresnahan (1989).
47The last 15 years has seen an explosion in the estimation of di®erentiated product demand systems in Industrial
Organization. See, inter alia, Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), and Petrin (2003) for
recent applications. Crandall and Furchtgott-Roth (1996), Crawford (2000), and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) apply
these tools in the cable industry.
48This can introduce di±cult identi¯cation issues as it may be hard to di®erentiate between price increases due to
diseconomies of scale and those due to increased exercise of market power. Bresnahan (1989) discusses this issue in
detail.
49A similar approach underlies the method of Conjectural Variations. Despite lacking a sound theoretical founda-
tion, the approach has been used to measure market power in oligopoly settings. See Bresnahan (1989) for more.
50Of course, this assumes there are good observable measures of product quality, qn. This must be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis.
51While conceptually simple, implementing the framework described above can be quite di±cult in practice. Di±-
cult identi¯cation issues arise in each of the papers surveyed below, casting at least some doubt on their conclusions.
Where possible, I note these concerns.
52Unfortunately, the paper lacks a clear discussion of identi¯cation. Estimation is "by two-stage least squares",
but the motivation for the exclusion restrictions that identify the key parameters is missing.
53In reduced form regressions, the level and shape of the distribution of household income, age, and size were
important determinants of cable prices and quality.
54The 1992 Cable Act, in addition to regulating prices, required systems to o®er a Basic Service containing all
o®ered broadcast and public, educational, and government channels. Many systems introduced "bare-bones" Limited
Basic Services as a consequence of those terms. The authors' results suggest this and not price caps had a greater
42e®ect on o®ered service quality in cable markets.
55In this setting, welfare e®ects are measured by either the compensating or equivalent variation. The compensating
and equivalent variation are measures of the amount of money required to make households in a market indi®erent
between facing a cable choice set (e.g. set of services, prices and qualities for those services) before and after a change
in the economic environment. The compensating variation asks how much money is required to make someone
indi®erent to their initial position; the equivalent variation asks how much money is required to make someone
indi®erent to their ¯nal position.
56This is likely an underestimate of the true welfare loss, as their quality measure is based on the number of o®ered
broadcast and satellite channels and the latter increased signi¯cantly in quality over the period.
57Care should be taken relying on welfare measures from logit demand systems, particularly when evaluating the
introduction of new products (Petrin (2003)). Crawford (2000) argues that this concern is moderated in his case
because of the popularity of the newly introduced services.
58For example, that the average number of networks increased by approximately 2 from 1992 to 1995 suggests
limited welfare gains to households; that on average 1.5 of those 2 were top-20 networks suggests the opposite
conclusion. Furthermore, many systems were alleged to have moved their most popular programming to unregulated
tiers of service in response to the Act and he can measure that e®ect.
59While both of these studies ¯nd consumers no better o® from regulation, it is important to note that each
draws inferences based on changes in cable choice sets over time. While this is clearly in°uenced by regulation,
any other changes in the economic environment will also in°uence the measures. Their conclusions must therefore
be conditioned on the (very strong) assumption that regulation is the only source of time-series variation in ¯rms'
o®erings.
60Hazlett and Spitzer (1997, Table 3-3) summarize the ¯ndings of these and a number of other studies in the 1980s
and early 1990s. Across a variety of datasets, duopoly cable markets are associated with prices 8%-34% lower than
monopoly cable markets.
61"Price" here equals price for Basic and Expanded Basic Services, plus equipment.
4362Because of this de¯nition, some care should be taken interpreting the results in this table too broadly. While, for
example, the national satellite market share has been above 15% since 2001, the share of subscribers in the 2004 price
survey served by cable systems that have been granted a ¯nding of e®ective competition due to satellite competition
was only 2.35% (FCC (2005a, Attachment 1)).
63The GAO studies appear to use homes passed and system age as instruments for satellite share, but it's hard to
see how these would be appropriate instruments. If correlated with satellite share due to di®erences across markets in
o®ered cable service quality, they should also be correlated with cable prices and belong in the cable price regression.
64Strictly speaking, they regress cable prices on the mean utility for satellite service. This can be considered a
measure of the satellite market share.
65This approach, while promising, relies heavily on the assumed functional forms for demand and pricing equations.
66Independent competitive cable companies, called Broadband Service Providers (BSPs), initially targeted business
and residential customers in large urban markets. Facing cost disadvantages for programming, relative to incumbent
cable operators. Due to their small scale, several have ¯led for bankruptcy, and they remain as a group of small
fraction of the MVPD industry.
67This is viewed in part as a defensive response to cable entry into local telephone service.
68They particularly object to build-out requirements, especially if they don't overlap with their service area.
69For example, an own-price elasticity of -1.5 would imply a markup of 67% in the case of a single-product
monopolist.
70Note such and measures are most relevant than the programming market. Incumbent cable systems do not
strictly he each other.
71Furthermore, Comcast and Time Warner have announced plans to purchase Adelphia's cable systems (Grant
and Angwin (2005)).
72The Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is sometimes used as a summary measure of concentration in a market.
It is given by the sum of the squares of the market shares for all the ¯rms in the market.
4473In FCC (2005d, Footnote 311), cable networks claim that Nielsen ratings data do not become useful until a
network has access to between 40 and 60 million subscribers. This limits it's ability to obtain advertising revenue
before that point. After a point, intuition suggests there are decreasing returns to scale in subscribers.
74These are Comcast with 10 a±liated national networks and 12 a±liated regional networks, Time Warner with
29 (12), Cox with 16 (5), and Cablevision with 5 (16).
75These are News Corp/Fox with 12 a±liated national networks and 22 a±liated regional networks, Disney/ABC
with 20 (0), Viacom/CBS with 39 (0), and GE/NBC with 17 (0).
76See also Waterman and Weiss (1997) for the impact of integration on carriage of basic cable
networks.
77e.g. antitrust challenges to Microsoft's bundling of software applications (e.g. its Internet browser, media player)
with its dominant Windows operating system (Mitchener and Kanter (2004)).
78Recent papers by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Armstrong (1999) extend the analysis of bundling to
consider multiple goods and ¯nd similar results to that presented below.
79Negative correlation, however, is not necessary for bundling to be pro¯table (McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston
(1989)).
80McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) extend the analysis of Adams and Yellen (1976) to consider mixed
bundling, the o®ering of both component and bundled sales, and show it always yields (weakly) greater pro¯ts than
pure bundling. The reason for this is clear: it maintains the bene¯ts of bundling (if any) and strictly increases the
number of prices available to capture surplus. Despite this fact, mixed bundling is relatively uncommon, perhaps due
to the added administrative costs associated with o®ering both bundled and component goods.
81The conclusions drawn for the pre-commitment case also obtain for the more realistic case that the incumbent
can charge a di®erent price in the event of entry.
82Insight Communications estimates 2/3 of its 1 million customers do not use a converter (FCC (2004a, p. 39)).
By contrast, all satellite subscribers must have a digital receiver/converter.
4583In work in progress, Crawford and Yurukoglu (2007) extend Crawford and Cullen (2007) by estimating the key
preference and cost parameters and ¯nd µ a la carte o®erings would increase consumer welfare in cable markets.
84This is the earliest for which data on clustering is available.
85These ¯ndings should be taken as merely suggestive. There could be important determinants of whether a
system is in a cluster that could be correlated with unobserved determinants of systems' service o®ering and pricing
decisions. These would need to be explored before de¯nitive conclusions could be drawn.
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55Table 1: Growth Rates in Cable and Satellite Prices by Period
Cable and
Period Satellite CPI Nondurable CPI Di®erence
12/86 - 4/93 8.99% 4.38% 4.61%
4/93 - 11/94 -2.34% 1.11% -3.45%
11/94 - 6/06 4.62% 2.28% 2.34%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
56Table 2: Growth Rates in MVPD Subscribers by Period
Cable +
Period Cable Subscribers Satellite Subscribers
1987 - 1993 5.03% 5.06%
1993 - 1995 4.20% 5.93%
1995 - 2004 0.70% 3.72%
Source: FCC (2001d), FCC (2002b), FCC (2003b), FCC (2004b), FCC (2005b)
57Table 3: Advanced Cable Services
Digital Programming Broadband Access
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Month Year O®ered Subscribed O®ered Subscribed
July 1998 16.8 19.3
July 1999 30.0 26.6
July 2000 58.1 45.4
July 2001 77.6 15.7 70.8 7.4
July 2002 88.3 24.1 69.8 9.6
Jan 2004 97.3 34.9 94.8 26.0
June 2005 40.3 34.6
Source: FCC (1999a), FCC (2000a), FCC (2001a), FCC (2002a), FCC (2003a), FCC (2005a), NCTA (2005b)
58Table 4: Noncompetitive and Competitive Cable Systems
Basic &
Exp. Basic Price per
Year Prices Channels Channel
Facing Facing Facing Facing Facing Facing
Noncomp. Wireline DBS Noncomp. Wireline DBS Noncomp. Wireline DBS
Systems Comp. Comp. Systems Comp. Comp. Systems Comp. Comp.
Levels
1998 29.97 29.46 31.40 48.8 49.9 31.9 0.61 0.59 0.98
1999 31.70 30.82 31.73 51.1 50.6 35.1 0.62 0.61 0.90
2000 34.11 33.74 33.23 54.8 56.5 38.6 0.62 0.60 0.86
2001 37.13 34.03 37.13 59.3 56.0 53.3 0.63 0.61 0.70
2002 40.26 37.61 37.05 62.7 60.9 53.9 0.64 0.62 0.69
2003 43.14 37.14 42.32 67.3 71.5 67.7 0.64 0.52 0.63
2004 45.56 38.67 43.95 70.1 75.3 70.5 0.65 0.51 0.62
Relative to Noncompetitive Systems
1998 -1.7 4.8 2.3 -34.6 -3.9 60.3
1999 -2.8 0.1 -1.0 -31.3 -1.8 45.7
2000 -1.1 -2.6 3.1 -29.6 -4.1 38.3
2001 -8.3 0.0 -5.6 -10.1 -3.0 11.3
2002 -6.6 -8.0 -2.9 -14.0 -3.8 7.1
2003 -13.9 -1.9 6.2 0.6 -19.0 -2.5
2004 -15.1 -3.5 7.4 0.6 -21.0 -4.1
Source: FCC (2000a), FCC (2001a), FCC (2002a), FCC (2003a), FCC (2005a)
59Table 5: Cable and Satellite Statistics
Share of Share of New
Subscribers MVPD Subscribers MVPD Subscribers
Year Cable Satellite Cable Satellite Cable Satellite
1993 57.2 0.1 99.8 0.2 | |
1994 59.7 0.6 99.0 1.0 83.3 16.7
1995 62.1 2.2 96.6 3.4 60.0 40.0
1996 63.5 4.3 93.7 6.3 40.0 60.0
1997 64.2 5.0 92.8 7.2 50.0 50.0
1998 65.4 7.2 90.1 9.9 35.3 64.7
1999 66.7 10.1 86.8 13.2 31.0 69.0
2000 66.3 13.0 83.6 16.4 -18.4 118.4
2001 66.7 16.1 80.6 19.4 12.7 87.3
2002 66.5 18.2 78.5 21.5 -10.5 110.5
2003 66.1 20.4 76.4 23.6 -25.7 125.7
2004 66.1 23.2 74.0 26.0 1.8 98.2
Source: FCC (2001d), FCC (2002b), FCC (2003b), FCC (2004b), FCC (2005b)
60Table 6: Concentration in the MVPD Market
1992 1997 2000 2004
Market Market Market Market
Rank Company Share Company Share Company Share Company Share
1 TCI 27.31 TCI 25.54 AT&T 19.07 Comcast 23.37
2 TimeWarner 15.28 TimeWarner 15.97 TimeWarner 14.92 DirecTV 12.10
3 Continental 7.53 MediaOne 6.95 DirecTV 10.28 TimeWarner 11.87
4 Comcast 7.12 Comcast 5.84 Comcast 8.43 EchoStar 10.63
5 Cox 4.74 Cox 4.44 Charter 7.36 Cox 6.92
6 Cablevision 3.48 Cablevision 3.92 Cox 7.27 Charter 6.73
7 TimesMirror 3.26 DirecTV 3.58 Adelphia 5.94 Adelphia 5.88
8 Viacom 3.09 Primestar 2.40 EchoStar 5.11 Cablevision 3.19
9 Century 2.48 Jones 2.00 Cablevision 4.29 Bright 2.37
10 Cablevision 2.48 Century 1.62 Insight 1.23 Mediacom 1.66
Top 4 57.24 Top 4 54.30 Top 4 52.70 Top 4 57.97
Top 8 71.81 Top 8 68.64 Top 8 78.38 Top 8 80.69
Top 25 |- Top 25 84.94 Top 25 89.75 Top 25 90.41
HHI |- HHI 1166 HHI 954 HHI 1097
Source: FCC (1997), FCC (1998b), FCC (2001d), FCC (2005b)
61Table 7: Clustering in the Cable Industry
Share of
Total Cluster Total Total
Year Clusters Subscribers Subscribers Subscribers
1994 97 20.1 59.7 0.337
1995 137 31.2 62.1 0.502
1996 139 33.6 63.5 0.529
1997 117 34.3 64.2 0.534
1998 106 40.4 65.4 0.618
1999 114 43.9 66.7 0.658
2000 108 54.4 66.3 0.821
2001 107 52.3 66.7 0.784
2002 109 51.3 66.5 0.771
2003 108 53.6 66.1 0.812
Source: FCC (2000d), FCC (2001d), FCC (2002b), FCC (2003b), FCC (2004b), FCC (2005b)
62Figure 1: Cable Industry Revenue, 1985-2004




















Total Revenue Viewer Revenue Advertising Revenue
Source: NCTA (2005f), NCTA (2005c).
63Figure 2: The Multichannel Video Programming Industry
Content Providers




































65Figure 4: MVPD (Cable + Satellite) Prices, 1983-2006
December 1983 = 100











MVPD (Cable + Satellite) CPI Nondurables CPI
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
66Figure 5: Cable and Satellite Subscribers, 1983-2004




















Cable Subscribers Satellite Subscribers
Source: Hazlett and Spitzer (1997), FCC (2001d), FCC (2004b), FCC (2005b)
67Figure 6: Cable Programming Network Availability and Carriage, 1975-2004











National Video Networks Average Basic and Digital Tier Networks
Source: Hazlett and Spitzer (1997, p.96), FCC (1998a), FCC (1999a), FCC (2000a), FCC (2001a), FCC (2002a),
FCC (2003a), FCC (2005a), NCTA (2005d)
68Figure 7: Cable Programming Network Cost, 1989-2003


































Subscriber Fees (All Chans, List)
Subscriber Fees (All Chans, Avg.)
Subscriber Fees (1989 Chans, List)
Subscriber Fees (1989 Chans, Avg.)
Average Basic + Digital Tier Networks
Source: Kagan World Media (1998), Kagan World Media (2004), Hazlett and Spitzer (1997)
69Figure 8: Premium Subscribers and Subscriptions, 1990-2003
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Source: FCC (1999b), FCC (2004b), FCC (2005b)
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Adapted from Maskin and Riley (1984).
71Figure 10: Bundling versus Component Sales: An Example
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Source: Adapted from Adams and Yellen (1976).
72Figure 11: Bundling to Deter Entry
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